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INTRODUCTION
Commentators have long discussed whether artificial
intelligence could perform legal reasoning; some projects have
attacked specific legal domains.' For decades, artificial intelligence in
general was more important theoretically than practically. Machine
learning, however, has in recent years shown tremendous practical
progress. 2 That progress stems partly from new algorithms but
also from the tremendous increase in computing resources and
availability of large data sets, which have given life to decades-old
theoretical work. At the same time, the domains proving most
amenable to machine learning have been quite different than
legal reasoning. Such areas as machine vision, internet searching,
language translation, handwriting recognition, 3 credit scoring, email
spam detection and viewing recommendations 4 are relatively focused
compared to legal reasoning, which is free-ranging, semantic and
conceptual. This paper explores whether the surprising success of
machine learning might extend to using those techniques to apply
copyright's fair use doctrine.
There would be a beaten path to the maker of software
that could reliably state whether a use of a copyrighted work was
protected as fair use. The question, "Is this fair use?" arises millions
1.

2

&

See Stephen M. McJohn, Review of Artificial Legal Intelligence, 12 HARV. J.L.
TECH. 241, 244 (1998) ("Thus, there have been a number of projects that
claim some progress toward automating legal reasoning. This naturally raises
the question, to what extent do the programs actually model the task at issue,
or, alternatively, succeed in producing results similar to human decisions?").
This paper relies heavily on PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM
(2015); IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING (2016); AURfLIEN
GiRON,

3
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LEARNING
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&

1

TENSORFLOW (Nicole Tache et al. eds., 1st ed. 2017).
See Yann LeCun et al., MACHINE LEARNING IN HANDWRITING, http://

yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (a training database
for "teaching" computers how to understand handwriting); Niek Temme,
Using TensorFlow to Create Your Own HandwritingRecognition Engine, BUSINESS
ANALYTICS: HARNESSING THE VALUE OF INFORMATION (Feb. 21, 2016,
7:24PM),
https://niektemme.com/2016/02/21/tensorflow-handwriting/;
Shan Carter et al., Four Experiments in Handwriting with a Neural Network,
DISTILL (Dec. 6, 2016), http://distill.pub/2016/handwriting/; Alexander
Mordvintsev & Abid K., OCR of Hand-written Data Using kNN, OPENCVPYTHON TUTORIALS (2013), http://opencv-python-tutroals.readthedocs.io/

4

en/latest/pytutorials/pyml/pyknn/pyknnopencv/pyknnopencv.html.
GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 445-82 (discussing applications of
deep learning, such as computer vision, speech recognition, natural language
processing and recommender systems).
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of times a day. A student using block quotes in a paper, a playwright
parodying a blockbuster movie, an activist passing on someone else's
video of a campaign speech, a fan posting a song on YouTube and a
documentary filmmaker using old news stories, all could benefit if
software could give an accurate prediction if they were infringing
or making fair use.s From the copyright holder's point of view, a
novelist who sees her work copied into fan fiction (with advertising),
a photographer whose work is picked up without permission by
major sites, and a music company that sees its songs posted on
YouTube might likewise wonder if fair use applied. In the most likely
application, sites that host user content, like YouTube or Twitter,
could use such a fair use daemon to help deal with the multitude
of postings each day. In addition, Google Translate's most recent
incarnation uses machine learning to produce accurate translations
between languages.' An able fair use analyzer would be useful in
many contexts.
Fair use determinations must consider four broad factors
in light of a vast7 amount of case law which has flowed in various
directions over time. Today's software could not replicate the process
that an experienced lawyer would use to assess a case.' But it is well
worth exploring how one might try to use machine learning on fair
use. First, the exercise of looking at how specific machine learning
algorithms might be used in fair use analysis can show which sorts
of algorithms might ultimately be best suited to the task.' Second,
5

6

7
8

9

Presently, for many potential fair uses, the default is that the site may block
the work, even if it qualifies for fair use. See generally Natalie Marfo, Playing
Fair: Youtube, Nintendo, and theLostBalance of Online FairUse, 13 BROOKJ. CORP.
FIN. & Com. L. 466 (2019).
Yongui Wu, et al., Google's Neural Machine Translation System: Bridging the
Gap between Human and Machine Translation 20 (2016), https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1609.08144v1.pdf.
Vast in the sense of case law to research, not in the sense of Big Data, as
discussed below.
Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1095 (2017)
(citing Mark A. Lemley, RationalizingInternet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 101, 110-11 (2007)) ("Skeptics believe that fair use
analysis cannot be automated. One concern is that it involves a high degree of
complexity, which requires discretion while weighing each of the four factors
in light of the purpose of copyright law.").
Considering how such algorithms might work can also bear on the
consideration that fair use programs might replicate implicit or explicit
biases in the design of the software. See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use,
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 285 (2019) ("Consequently, it may seem desirable
to incorporate fair use metrics into copyright policing algorithms, both to
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examining how machine learning might fit fair use analysis can be a
useful way of studying how fair use analysis itself works in actuality.
Third, software will likely be used anyway to, in effect, make
fair use determinations. We can see that by comparison with a
related issue: whether material potentially infringes copyright. As
with fair use, today's software is not ready to make the initial, subtle
determination of whether a copyright has been infringed. That
determination requires considering whether original expressive
material has been copied (or adapted, distributed, performed,
or displayed). For example, to see if a song posted on YouTube
potentially infringes (i.e. without even considering whether the
post is fair use), one would have to identify original elements in the
copyrighted work that were copied into the accused copy, and then
filter out any non-protected elements that were copied, such as nonoriginal elements copied from still other works, or non-protected
ideas (ideas may be copied without infringing copyright). Notable
recent music copyright cases such as the Blurred Lines case10 show
how difficult that assessment can be.
Assessment of potential infringement is a subtle analysis.
Nevertheless, in effect, most copyright infringement analysis today is
done automatically by software. Copyright holders use software to
crawl the web, search for copies of their works, and generate take-down
notices - thereby making implicit infringement determinations, but
bluntly, without actually considering such questions as originality
or the non-protection of ideas, let alone fair use. This brute force
approach may be accurate in the majority of cases, but it is harsh
in some. YouTube likewise relies on automated processes. YouTube
allows copyright holders to submit works to YouTube's Content ID
System. When a work is uploaded to YouTube, it is compared to the
Content ID database, and if identified as infringing, the copyright

10

protect against automated over-deterrence, and to inform users of their
compliance with copyright law. In this paper I examine the prospects for
algorithmic mediation of copyright exceptions, warning that the design values
embedded in algorithms will inevitably become embedded in public behavior
and consciousness."). The potential use of AI for legal decision-making raises
philosophical and jurisprudential issues. See Lawrence B. Solum, Artificially
IntelligentLaw, BioLAwJ. - RIVISTA DI BioDIRITTO 58-61 (April 14, 2019),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.3337696; Rebecca A. Williams, Rethinking
Deference for Algorithmic Decision-Making 2-3 (Aug. 31, 2018) (unpublished
research paper) (available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3242482).
See Williams v. Gaye, 885 E3d 1150, 1172 (9th Cir. 2018) (upholding jury
finding of infringement in controversial music copyright case).

104

McJohn and McJohn

holder is given the choice between taking the work down or
allowing it to remain in place with advertising revenue going to the
copyright holder. In many online contexts, then, whether copyright
infringement has occurred is implicitly decided by software - not as
a judicial matter, but as a practical one. Online services also have
incentive to assess whether a posting is not infringement, but fair
use. This may allow users to post more material, which may make
the service more attractive to users. It may help the services respond
with more nuance to take-down orders generated automatically by
copyright holders.
This paper explores whether fair use determinations are
amenable to machine learning. In short, fair use is too complicated and
nuanced, and involves such a broad range of subject matter like music,
video, literature, and far more, to simply write a program to handle it.
Machine learning has successfully seen computers teach themselves
to identify spam emails, recognize objects in images and video,
translate languages, and play chess. This paper surveys the leading
schools of machine learning and how each may have advantages and
disadvantages in dealing with fair use. It may be that fair use machine
learning in early generations may have some success by looking at
a few statistically, if not necessarily legally, relevant factors. This
paper further suggests that whether later generations can make finer
discriminations may depend on the progress of machine learning, and
related disciplines in computer science, in identifying concepts and
representing knowledge. Ironically, some of that work may stem from
knowledge engineering, the branch of artificial intelligence that has
been somewhat eclipsed by the spectacular achievements of machine
learning in recent years. This paper also touches on possible legal
issues with using machine learning to apply fair use (e.g., whether
automated analysis of fair use is inconsistent with the case-bound
analysis required by courts, and possible application of the recent
data protection regulations in Europe), including by private actors
such as sites that host user-posted content.
II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: FROM KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING
TO MACHINE LEARNING

Discussions of artificial intelligence came considerably
earlier than even the most rudimentary electronic computer. Alan
Turing established the basic mathematical principles of computing,
most notably with the concept of a Turing machine, a theoretical
prototype of today's programmed devices, and his proofs on the
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limits on computability." Turing also explored theoretically whether
machines could think like humans, formulating what Turing called
the "Imitation Game," and what everyone else has called the "Turing
Test," broadly understood as whether a machine could carry on a
conversation sufficiently intelligently to be indistinguishable from
a human. Once electronic computers were developed, programmers
worked at, among many other things, using that modest computing
power to do tasks the way that a human did them. 'Artificial
Intelligence" became one, ill-defined area of computer science. No
single definition can capture the variety of projects. Some consider
AI the attempt to do with computers what humans do with their
brains. A useful way of defining AI is "that it consists of finding
heuristic solutions to NP-complete problems." 12 In other words,
some mathematical problems can be solved and checked. Those can
be written in computer programs. Some mathematical problems
are so complex that we cannot even check if a proposed solution
is correct. In the middle are NP-complete problems, which are
too complex to solve even with gigantic computer resources, but
where a proposed solution may be checked.13 Humans are good
at approximating solutions to some such problems, like driving a
car without exactly figuring out all the practically infinite physics
problems. AI can be considered the endeavor to likewise formulate
approximations to such problems with computers. Measuring the
capabilities of computers against humans has become less important
as it becomes clearer that computers accomplish tasks in much
different ways, however comparison to humans is still relevant in
many cases. Whether self-driving cars should be permitted might
depend, in part, on how well they perform compared to human
11

12
13

On whether Turing's Halting Problem places theoretical limits on the
ability to use artificial intelligence to analyze legal problems, see Jeffrey M.
Lipshaw, Halting, Intuition, Heuristics, and Action: Alan Turing and the Theoretical
Constraintson AI-Lawyering, 5 SAVANNAH L. REV. 133, 147 (2018) (footnotes
omitted) ("In the abstract, then, any modern digital computer that runs on
stored programs is a universal Turing machine. Kearse, if it were to exist in
the foreseeable future, would be a Turing machine and quite capable. But it
would also be subject to the mathematical constraints of a Turing machine,
namely, the inability to determine for every program that it might run whether
it would, on one hand, complete that program and generate an answer, or, on
the other hand, get stuck in a loop.").
DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 33.
Other NP-complete problems include "the shortest route to visit a set of
cities, the best layout of components on a microchip, the best placement of
sensors in an ecosystem .

.

. and (most important) your Tetris score." Id.
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drivers. But the central questions now might be simply how and
whether machines perform tasks, and what safeguards might be
appropriate.
AI can usefully be divided into two approaches: machine
learning and knowledge engineering.1 4 Machine learning includes
such areas as neural networks. The human brain learns with networks
of neurons, although it remains disputed how it learns and the extent
to which knowledge and abilities are "hard-wired" from birth."
This question prompted researchers to try to develop electronic
networks that could learn. The Perceptron was a very notable early
example, which "was simple, yet it could recognize printed letters
and speech sounds just by being trained with examples."16 However,
others proved mathematically that the Perceptron would be unable
to learn some things, most notably the XOR operation, a basic
logical operation dear to the hearts of computer scientists.1 7 With
these apparent limitations on the capabilities of networks to learn,
research in that area faltered.
For a period of time, AI research's center of gravity shifted
to the other approach: knowledge engineering - the idea that
programs would be written to accomplish tasks previously reserved
to humans." One set of such programs has been called Symbolic
AI, including programs that could prove mathematical theorems
or play a decent game of chess, which could be expanded to the
extent that reasoning was based on logic and symbols. Another
category was the expert system. This approach was to carefully
observe how a human expert in a particular domain accomplished
a task, then write a program that followed that approach step-bystep. Early hopes for this approach, however, were not realized.
The theorem-proving approach proved limited to circumscribed
areas like mathematics, because real-world applications required
the need for implicit knowledge about the world 2 0 and for robust
14

See id. at 102-04.

15
16

See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE
DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 100.

17

Id. at 100-01 (discussing MARVIN L. MINSKY & SEYMOUR A. PAPERT,

18
19

Id. at 101.
On the efforts to build expert systems in law, see RICHARD E. SUSSKIND,
EXPERT SYSTEMS IN LAW (1987).
Note that although machine learning has found many useful applications,
these issues remain at the frontiers of artificial intelligence research. See
GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 486 (emphasis removed) (first citing

PERCEPTRONS

20

BLANK SLATE

(2003).

(1969)).
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reasoning which allowed for fuzzy concepts. Building expert systems
similarly turned out to require much more than could be specified
in a program. 2 1 Experts may follow a series of steps, but also employ
a great deal of background knowledge and make judgements much
more flexibly than the steps of an algorithm.22 There were heroic
efforts to compile the sort of background factual knowledge that
humans use. 23 The Cyc project attempted to simply catalog as many
facts as possible about the world.2 4 After bloating with new facts
for over thirty years, Cyc still has yet to achieve even commonsense
reasoning. 25
In the field of law, early projects in applying artificial
intelligence techniques to legal reasoning followed a similar arc.
Case-based reasoning systems sought to find weights of various
factors identified in case law and use those to predict future cases
or formulate arguments. 26 Expert system projects arose, such as

22
23
24

See id. at 90.
Id. at 35.
Id.

25

Id. ("Thirty years later, Cyc continues to grow without end in sight, and
commonsense reasoning still eludes it. Ironically, Lenat has belatedly
embraced populating Cyc by mining the web, not because Cyc can read, but
because there's no other way.").
See McJohn, supra note 1, at 242-43 ('Anne Von der Lieth Gardner's GP
program attempted to use previous cases to distinguish easy from hard cases
in the area of contract law .... The Norwegian Research Centre for Computers
and Law developed SARA, an attempt to model the differing weights given to
relevant factors in applying legal norms . . . . Kevin Ashley's HYPO system
used a database of some thirty cases to compare a case to precedent cases,
examining whether similarities existed with respect to given factors . ...

26

"

21

Roberto Navigli & Paola Velardi, StructuralSemantic Interconnection:A KnowledgeBased Approach to Word Sense Disambiguation, 27 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
PATTERNANALYSIS &MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 1075, 1075-86 (2005); then
citing Antoine Bordes et al., Joint Learning of Words and Meaning Representations
for Open-Text Semantic Parsing, 22 PROC. OF MACHINE LEARNING RES. 127
(2012)) (discussing the challenge of knowledge representation and "wordsense disambiguation ... which is the task of deciding which sense of a word
is the appropriate one, in some context.").
DOMINGOS, supranote 2, at 89-90 ("In the 1970s, so-called knowledge-based
systems scored some impressive successes, and in the 1980s they spread
rapidly, but then they died out. The main reason they did was the infamous
knowledge acquisition bottleneck: extracting knowledge from experts and
encoding it as rules is just too difficult, labor-intensive, and failure-prone to
be viable for most problems. Letting the computer automatically learn to,
say, diagnose diseases by looking at databases of past patients' symptoms
and the corresponding outcomes turned out to be much easier than endlessly
interviewing doctors.").
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the use of ten key questions to determine the ownership of found
property. 27 Other projects sought to develop formal representations
of legal concepts in such areas of the law as tax and negotiable
instruments. 28 As in Al generally at the time, the early projects
were seen as stepping stones toward future, practical applications of
artificial intelligence. 29 The greatest value of the projects may have
been in identifying the aspects of legal reasoning which put it beyond
the artificial intelligence techniques of the day: legal reasoning is illdefined, complex and context-dependent, and deals with rules and
cases that are vague and inconsistent.3 0 As with case-based reasoning
and expert systems in other areas, these projects did not lead to
others with anything like human-level performance.3 1 As the author
of a book on expert systems in law later recognized, in the legal
area software became useful not for legal reasoning, but to automate
lower-level tasks, such as document searching and preparation,
albeit with sophisticated technology.3 2 That trend has continued
until today, where technology in legal practice is geared toward areas
like document identification in discovery and provision of forms
(legal forms have long constituted the most useful knowledge-based
(footnote omitted)).
27

28
29

McJohn, supra note 1, at 243 ('Alan Tyree's FINDER program sought to
automate the analysis of deciding whether a found piece of property belonged
to its finder by asking ten key questions and attempting to determine the
result of the case from the answers.").
See McJohn, supra note 1, at 243 (discussing L.T. McCarty's TAXMAN program
and Carole Hafier's LIRS project).
Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model

of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957, 1980 (1990) ("Legal reasoning is
complex. Our current AI models, albeit too simple, are but steps to more
subtle and complete models, and at each step we understand more."). As
the author of the landmark TAXMAN project put it: "In general, then, the
detailed analysis of the TAXMAN system has tended to support what should
surely be a lawyer's intuition: that the current TAXMAN paradigm fails to
capture many of the significant facts about the structure of legal concepts and
the process of legal reasoning .... Although we would ultimately come to the
conclusion, not unlike the lawyer's intuition, that nothing as complex as legal
reasoning could ever be represented in a computer program, I believe it would
be possible to sketch out a formal computer model somewhat more realistic
than the current version of TAXMAN." L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on
Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90
HARV.

30
31
32

L. REv. 837, 892-93 (1977).

See McJohn, supra note 1, at 250-5 1.
Rissland, supra note 29, at 1980.
See McJohn, supra note 1, at 253.
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expert system for lawyers).3 Technology-assisted review ("TAR") is
now standard in litigation: "the case law has developed to the point
that it is now black letter law that where the producing party wants
to utilize TAR for document review, courts will permit it." 34
Meanwhile, in artificial intelligence research generally, the
artificial neural network approach found new life.35 The technique
of backpropagation overcame the limits of the Perceptron.36 Rather
than simply training the outer layer of a network, in backpropagation
errors are communicated to the lower layers, so that inner nodes of
the network adjust. A node that contributed to a correct classification
may be reinforced so that it becomes more influential in later
decisions. A node that contributed to an error may conversely get
less weight. Networks were trained to accomplish numerous tasks,
showing the potential of learning.3 7 At the same time, these projects
were more narrowly focused. Rather than attempting to create a
broad-ranging intelligent machine, networks were designed to learn
quite specific tasks.
Machine learning's successes were not in domains similar
to legal reasoning, so the growth in machine learning has not been
matched with a resurgence in applying those techniques to legal
reasoning. Instead, machine learning has found broad applications
33

See, e.g., Pamela Radford, HarnessingTechnology DuringDiscovery, 82 ADVOCATE
*39, *40 (2018) ('A second product like iControl's Envise or BrainSpace
6 is the leap or 'predictive coding' piece. Those tools use 'active' machine
learning technology, sometimes referred to as 'Continuous Active Learning'
(CAL) which feeds the 'review' software what it learns. Using only the passive
learning technology will get you to the same result in document review, but
adding true 'active learning' gets you to the finish line faster and using less
resources."); Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87,
87-88 (2014) ("It misses a class of legal tasks for which current AI technology
can still have an impact even given the technological inability to match humanlevel reasoning .. . this Article will suggest that there may be a limited, but

34
35

not insignificant, subset of legal tasks that are capable of being partially
automated using current AI techniques despite their limitations relative to
human cognition.").
Rio Tinto PL.C. v. Vale S.A., 306 ER.D. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 17 ("In the 1980's, the second wave
of neural network research emerged in great part via a movement called
connectionism or parallel distributed processing . . . . The connectionists

began to study models of cognition that could actually be grounded in neural
.

implementations . .

36
37

See id. at 18.
See id. ("During this time, neural networks continued to obtain impressive
performance on some tasks.").
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in legal practice beyond abstract legal reasoning. In discovery, for
example, machine learning can be used to detect patterns that are
likely to produce documents responsive to requests.3 8 Rather than
simple key word searches, which depend on the party thinking of
all the words that might relate, a machine learning system might
produce a more robust set of responsive documents.39 Machine
learning is finding a place in empirical research about the legal
system itself. One study had considerable accuracy in predicting
dissents, using such factors as the length of the opinion, the number
of citations and voting valence among judges.4 0
At present, machine learning techniques have the definite
advantage over knowledge engineering, in purely engineering
terms. Machine learning has shown greater capabilities and is more
widely deployed, at least in areas that might be considered artificial
intelligence. There may also be policy reasons to prefer machine
learning. Knowledge engineering seeks to write programs that
mimic the practices of experts. It may yet prove feasible to build
an expert system for fair use, coding how a judge might apply the
various rules (statutory and case law) comprising fair use. But, in
an area as vague and flexible as fair use, that may hazard replicating
the biases of the system designer.4 1 To the extent machine learning
extracts patterns from decided cases, that may be less of a hazard,
although constructing a machine learning system requires human
steps that will also introduce bias.
38
39

40

41

See, e.g., Radford, supra note 33, at 40 ("A second product like iControl's Envise
or BrainSpace 6 is the leap or 'predictive coding' piece.").
See id. ("Using only the passive learning technology will get you to the same
result in document review, but adding true 'active learning' gets you to the
finish line faster and using less resources.").
Shivam Verma et al., The Genealogy of Ideology: Predicting Agreement and
PersuasiveMemes in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAw 253 (2017),
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id = 30865 12&picked= prox ("We employ
machine learning techniques to identify common characteristics and features
from cases in the US courts of appeals that contribute in determining dissent.
Our models were able to predict vote alignment with an average F1 score
of 73%, and our results show that the length of the opinion, the number of
citations in the opinion, and voting valence, are all key factors in determining
dissent.").
See Burk, supra note 9, at 283 (warning that to the extent it is possible to
"incorporate fair use metrics into copyright policing algorithms," that "the
design values embedded in algorithms will inevitably become embedded in
public behavior and consciousness").
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III. FAIR USE AND ITS COMPLEXITIES
The Copyright Act states a four-factor rule for fair use:
107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors. 4 2
At first blush, the rule might seem designed for machine
learning: a binary classification (fair use or not fair use), based on four
factors. But, like all legal rules, the dynamics of the provision are more
complex. As applied by the courts, fair use has many complicating,
sometimes confounding, aspects.
Each of the factors has been interpreted to bring in different,
sometimes conflicting, policies. The first factor, purpose of the use,
42

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).

112

Mcjohn and Mcjohn

calls for the court to ask whether the use falls into a favored category
(the preamble specifically identifies some: "criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research") .4 Beyond the specific activity, the
underlying purpose must also be considered ("including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes")." Many of the categories favored in the first question

(criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship,
research) are commercial, and so fall into the disfavored category in
the second question.
In addition to the categories stated in the statute, courts
have classified the purpose of the use in various respects. A longstanding distinction was between reproductive uses (merely making
a copy) and productive uses (using the copyrighted work as a basis
for another work, or simply using the copyrighted work in a valuable
manner, to some courts) .4 In recent years, courts have differentiated
between "transformative" and non-transformative uses.4 6 The
Supreme Court adopted the approach in Campbell,47 holding that fair
use was favored because the rap parody version of the country song
Pretty Woman transformed the work. "Transformative" before too
long became almost a magic word, with courts applying the term to
uses that did not change the form of (transform) the work, but rather
used the work in a different way. The Second Circuit noted several
uses deemed transformative which did not adapt the original into a
43
44
45

46

47

Id.
Id.
Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright, 35 SAN DI EGO L.
REv. 61, 93 (1998) ("Courts have also used fair use in a more subtle way
to balance the incentives of copyright by distinguishing between 'productive'
and 'reproductive' uses. A reproductive use simply makes copies that compete
with the copies authorized by the copyright holder. Where a use is productive,
however, defendant goes beyond copying to contribute some independent
value.") (footnotes omitted).
Laura A. Heymann, Everything is Transformative:Fair Use and Reader Response, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 447 (2008) (footnotes omitted) ("In Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, the Supreme Court, relying on a 1990 law review article by
Judge Pierre Leval, suggested that an important factor to consider in whether
a use was fair was whether the second use was 'transformative' - whether it
'adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering
the first with new expression, meaning, or message.' Although some uses are
more appropriately considered with regard to whether they are 'transformative'
than others, the term has since become as fundamental a part of any fair use
analysis as the statutory language itself.").
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994).
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new, creative form: "scanning books to create a full-text searchable
database and public search function (in a manner that did not allow
users to read the texts) . . . copying works into a database used to
detect plagiarism . . . displaying tiny, low-resolution "thumbnail"

.

reproductions of art works to provide links serving as Internet
pathways to the appropriate websites containing the originals . .
and copying by one who has acquired the right to view the content
of a telecast to enable a single, non-commercial home viewing at a
more convenient time.""
Another dimension (quite literally, if we are to discuss
applying machine learning to fair use) on "the purpose and character
of the use" is whether an expressive use triggers considerations of
First Amendment protections. The Supreme Court has effectively
constitutionalized fair use. Eldred held that Congress did not run
afoul of the First Amendment in retroactively extending the terms
of existing copyrights in 1998,11 although that would keep works
out of the public domain longer, thereby restricting the ability of
others to use those works expressively. One rationale was that the
Copyright Law contains "built-in" First Amendment protections,
namely fair use and the nonprotection of ideas.s0 Along those lines,
courts consider First Amendment interests in fair use, 51 such as
using protected works to criticize public officials.52
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, likewise
has prompted a variety of judicial approaches.53 Courts regularly
differentiate between works with thick and thin copyright protection.
48
49
50
51

52
53

54

Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 E3d 649, 660-61 (2d Cir. 2018)
(citations omitted).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
Id. at 219-20.
See, e.g., Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed'n of Ohio, 15 E3d
559, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) ("This contrast with commercial activity helps show
that the purpose and character of HCF's use is far removed from that which
the copyright law centrally protects and instead falls within the realm of the
designated fair use purposes. The document was used primarily in exercising
HCF's First Amendment speech rights to comment on public issues and to
petition the government regarding legislation.").
See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 E3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding
that use of a modified picture of mayor used on T-shirt was fair use).
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2 005,
156 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 610 (2008) (footnote omitted) ("Factor two instructs
courts to consider 'the nature of the copyrighted work.' The data with respect
to factor two are seemingly as ambiguous and open to interpretation as the
statutory language itself.").
See, e.g., Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P, 756 E3d 73, 87 (2d
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Copyright protects only the original expressive elements of a work."
A work may be composed largely of non-protected elements."
Software, mainly functional, qualifies for copyright protection as
a literary work, 7 perhaps to the surprise of literature professors.
A database is composed of nonoriginal and so nonprotected facts,
but may have the necessary creativity for copyright protection by
virtue of a creative selection, arrangement or coordination of those
facts." Such thinly protected works are more subject to fair use on
the theory that the use is largely exploiting unprotected aspects of
the work. In a subset of those cases, copying may be done in order to
extract unprotected elements from a work, such as where software
is copied to reverse-engineer its functionality" or where a database
is copied to copy its unprotected facts.6 0 The nature of the work
can be characterized in other ways. Harper & Row6 1 put considerable
weight on the fact that the work copied, the autobiography of former
United States President Gerald Ford, was soon to be published, so
the copier in effect appropriated the right of first publication (not a
right that appears in the Copyright Act).
The third factor sounds simply quantitative, and so readily
amenable to machine learning: "the amount and substantiality of

55
56

57
58
59
60

61

Cir. 2014) ("As relevant here, this factor requires us to consider the extent of
Swatch's copyright in the recording-the 'thickness' or 'thinness' of Swatch's
exclusive rights-as well as whether or not the recording had been published
at the time of Bloomberg's use." ).
See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
See, e.g., Swatch Grp., 756 E3d at 89 ("[E]ven within the field of fact works,
there are gradations as to the relative proportion of fact and fancy. One may
move from sparsely embellished maps and directories to elegantly written
biography. The extent to which one must permit expressive language to be
copied, in order to assure dissemination of the underlying facts, will thus vary
from case to case." (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985))).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 344-45.
See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 E2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir.
1992).
Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 E3d 640, 645 (7th Cir.
2003) ("Similarly, if the only way WIREdata could obtain public-domain data
about properties in southeastern Wisconsin would be by copying the data in
the municipalities' databases as embedded in Market Drive, so that it would
be copying the compilation and not just the compiled data only because the
data and the format in which they were organized could not be disentangled,
it would be privileged to make such a copy, and likewise the municipalities.").
Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 569.
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the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." 6 2
In many cases, it is.63 Where the defendant copies the entire work,
fair use is less likely, and where the defendant copies only a small
portion, fair use is more likely. 4 But the courts have introduced
many qualitative elements into consideration of this factor. The
Supreme Court cases contrast. In Sony, the defendants copied
the entire television programs at issue, but fair use nevertheless
applied." In Harper& Row, the Nation magazine copied only a few
pages of former President Gerald Ford's biography, but fair use did
not apply: the Nation had copied "the heart of the book," the few
pages where Ford described how he came to pardon his predecessor,
Richard Nixon.6 6 In addition, courts consider not just the amount
copied, but how well that amount corresponds to the favored use. 7
The last factor is "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work."" This factor sounds
quantitative, redolent of micro-economics and finance. But courts
again bring in many qualitative considerations. On its face, the factor
presents a conundrum. One reading of the factor could make fair
use redundant. Fair use, by definition, applies to unauthorized uses.
Without fair use, such users would have to seek a license from the
copyright holder. That being the case, every such use could negatively
affect the potential market for the work. So if the copyright holder
and potential user were in a position to negotiate, the use without
authorization must have denied the copyright holder potential
revenue. There could be some cases where the copyright holder and
potential user were not in a position to negotiate. In particular, if the
62
63

64

65
66
67

68

17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 E3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) ('A
finding of fair use is more likely when small amounts, or less important
passages, are copied than when the copying is extensive, or encompasses the
most important parts of the original.").
Swatch Grp., 756 E3d at 89-90 (quoting Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood,
150 E3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998)) ("In general, 'the more of a copyrighted
work that is taken, the less likely the use is to be fair."').
Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984)
(holding that fair use could apply even though the entire works were copied).
Harper&Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65 ("The portions actually quoted were selected
by Mr. Navasky as among the most powerful passages in those chapters.").
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (quoting Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 564) (internal quotations omitted) ("[E]ven substantial
quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a news
account of a speech but not in a scoop of a soon-to-be-published memoir.").
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
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transactions costs of the negotiation were greater than the potential
value to the user, then the transaction would not occur."9 So, fair use
could authorize such uses. But those uses are also so inconsequential
that litigation to enforce the copyright would likewise be not worth
it. Thus, fair use would be reduced to inconsequential cases that
would be unlikely to make it to court. Fair use would also shrink as
new licensing techniques developed.
Courts have neither followed that narrow approach nor
resolved the underlying conundrum. Rather, courts follow a number
of approaches in considering whether and to what extent there is a
loss of market or value.70 Campbell held that certain losses would not
be cognizable. If a parody or a review was such effective criticism
that it led to fewer sales of the work, that would not be a cognizable
loss of market.7 2 Similarly, where copying was done to reverse
engineer a product by copying its nonprotected functional aspects,
the introduction of a competing product would not represent a
cognizable loss to the copyright holder. Campbell also recognized that
certain losses would not count, where the copyright holder would
not have taken advantage of them.7 3 If the copyright holder of Pretty
Woman would not have authorized a rap parody version, then that
illusory lost licensing opportunity would not weigh against fair use.
In addition to the varied interpretation of each factor, the
factors are applied interdependently. Campbell held that "the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use."7 Where the use is noncommercial, there may be a
greater burden for a party to show loss to its market. 6 Where the
69

70

71
72
73
74
75
76

See generally WendyJ. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structuraland Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1601
(1982).
Beebe, supranote 53, at 621 ("Factor four provides the analytical space for this
balancing test to occur, and the various doctrinal propositions under factor
four are merely there to tilt the scales one way or the other.").
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
Id.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 592-94.
Id. at 579.
Zahr K. Said, Foreword:Fair Use in the DigitalAge, and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose at
21, 90 WASH. L. REv. 579, 582 (2015) ("[Campbell] reversed the momentum
created by two key presumptions in prior case law, namely that commercial
uses were presumptively unfair, and that plaintiffs were allowed to presume
harm when defendants' uses were commercial.").
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use is commercial, some loss may be presumed. The amount of the
work copied may be excusable depending on the nature of the use,
especially if the amount is geared toward the amount necessary
to make such a use.n Which factors are most important is quite
unsettled. The law review article that inspired Campbell to look to
the "transformative" use referred to the first factor as "the soul of
fair use, while courts sometimes refer to the fourth factor, effect
on the market, as the most important factor.
As a legal rule, Section 107 does not guide the decision
maker. It simply states that fair use is not infringement, and that
the court should consider four factors. The rule does not state how
the factors should be weighed. Nor does it state whether additional
factors may be considered, although the factors may be read broadly
enough to accommodate almost any fact or consideration a court
wishes to include. Discerning how courts have in fact applied those
factors is the strength of machine learning.
Likewise, machine learning can discern patterns (although
sometimes unreliably), which may be apt to address doctrinal
uncertainty. Fair use has been considered unpredictable; in Judge
Learned Hand's words, "the issue of fair use . . . is the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright."so Whether a proposed
use qualifies for fair use is often an uncertain decision. As Professor
Madison put it, "twenty-five years after the doctrine was codified
in the Copyright Act of 1976, courts are no closer to a meaningful
understanding of the doctrine than Congress appeared to be at the
time of the law's enactment."8 1 Other commentators have found
77

78

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50
(1984) ("Moreover, when one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted
audiovisual work, see 17 U.S.C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely
enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness
in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced,
see id., at § 107(3), does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a
finding of fair use.").
Said, supra note 76, at 581-582 ("The Court had relied on Judge Pierre N.
Leval's seminal Harvard Law Review article, Toward a Fair Use Standard,
to articulate a framework for assessing the reason for a defendant's use of
plaintiff's work.

79
80
81

. .

. He has referred to the factor one analysis as 'the soul of

fair use."').
Beebe, supra note 53, at 617 ("Of the opinions following Campbell, 26.5%
continued explicitly to state that factor four was the most important factor.").
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 E2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam
opinion attributed to Judge Learned Hand).
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-OrientedApproach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
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more regularity in fair use case law. Professor Samuelson found fair
use "more coherent and more predictable than many commentators
have perceived once one recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall
into common patterns, or what this Article will call policy-relevant
clusters."8 2
Fair use cases often involve disagreement even between the
judges. The first two fair uses cases to reach the Supreme Court in
modern times did not yield an opinion because the Justices split
4-4.83 Of the three key Supreme Court cases to follow, the court
was divided: 5-4 in Sony,14 6-3 in Harper & Row,"s and a unanimous
opinion in Campbell." Reversals are frequent in fair use cases. 7 To
use examples of key recent fair use cases: in Cambridge University
Press"8 (on whether course packs are fair use), the panel reversed the
trial court and then reversed it again when the case returned after
remand; in Carioull (whether painting on photographs, termed by
some "appropriation art," is fair use), the Second Circuit reversed
with respect to most of the images at issue; in Oracle v. Google
(whether it was fair use for Google to copy application programming
interfaces of Java), a case with "huge stakes" for the software
industry, 0 the Federal Circuit reversed a jury verdict of fair use."1
82

83

84
85
86
87
88
89

90

91

REV. 1525, 1549 (2004).
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 254142 (2009) ("The policies underlying modern fair use law include promoting
freedom of speech and of expression, the ongoing progress of authorship,
learning, access to information, truth telling or truth seeking, competition,
technological innovation, and privacy and autonomy interests of users.").
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07
(1990) (discussing Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376
(1975) and Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958)).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
An empirical study found, however, no disparity between reversal rates in fair
use cases compared to other areas of the law. Beebe, supra note 53, at 554.
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 E3d 1290, 1293-1302 (11th Cir. 2018).
Cariou v. Prince, 714 E3d 694, 695, 699, 712 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Prince is a wellknown appropriation artist. The Tate Gallery has defined appropriation art as
'the more or less direct taking over into a work of art a real object or even an
existing work of art."').
Timothy B. Lee, Google asks Supreme Court to overrule disastrous ruling on API
copyrights, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 25, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/20 19/0 1/google-asks-supreme-court-to-overrule-disastrous-rulingon-api-copyrights/.
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 E3d 1179, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
("Because we conclude that Google's use of the Java API packages was
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None of those cases ruled categorically on the practice at issue,
meaning that fair use may, to some undetermined extent, apply to
course packs and appropriation art. Notably, a thorough empirical
study of fair use cases determined that "the lower courts repeatedly
and systematically inverted Supreme Court dicta to favor the
defendant, so that if the Court stated, for example, only that 'not x'
favors the plaintiff, the primary lesson the lower courts would draw
from this is that 'x' favors the defendant." 9 2 There are differences in
how the various federal circuits apply fair use. The Seventh Circuit
rejected other circuit's broad reading of "transformative." 9 3 Whether
fair use protects uses to exploit the functional aspects of software
has yielded an apparent divide.1 4
The reported cases indicate that fair use is uncertain."
But the reported cases are not a random sample of fair use cases.
Rather, they represent cases where the parties had incentive and
resources to litigate the case to judgment and appeal. It may be that
the reported cases are those where the application was sufficiently
unpredictable such that the parties' predictions differed. Plaintiff
thought fair use would not apply, defendant thought it would, and

92
93

94

95

not fair as a matter of law, we reverse the district court's decisions denying
Oracle's motions for JMOL and remand for a trial on damages.").
Beebe, supra note 53, at 556.
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 E3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing
Cariou, 714 E3d at 706) ("We're skeptical of Cariou's approach, because
asking exclusively whether something is 'transformative' not only replaces
the list in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects
derivative works. To say that a new use transforms the work is precisely to say
that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected under § 106(2).
Cariou and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do not explain how every
'transformative use' can be 'fair use' without extinguishing the author's rights
under § 106(2)."); see also Jiarui Liu, An EmpiricalStudy of Transformative Use in
Copyright Law, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 163, 240 (2019) ("Nonetheless, it is
difficult to say with confidence that transformative use is an improvement
over its ancestors. While the new label has harmonized fair use rhetoric, it
falls short of streamlining fair use practice or increasing its predictability.").
Compare Sony Comput. Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 E3d 596, 608
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding fair use authorized copying of code to reverse
engineer functional aspects) and Oracle, 886 E3d at 1200 (holding fair use did
not authorize copying of application programming interfaces of Java done to
facilitate interoperability).
The extent of that uncertainty is subject to disagreement. See Matthew Sag,
PredictingFair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 85 (2012) ("The final, and perhaps most
important contribution of this Article is that it offers considerable evidence
against the oft-repeated assertion that fair use adjudication is blighted by
unpredictability and doctrinal incoherence.").
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both chose litigation (in the face of the other parties' resistance to
settling the dispute), because of their different assessments. Cases
where fair use clearly does not apply may be less likely to make it
to court, because defendants will cave. Conversely, where fair use
applies, plaintiffs will not go to court. But that game-theoretical
explanation is slightly undercut by the fact that copyright cases
are rarely single issue cases. Defendant is likely to argue that the
work does not qualify for copyright, that plaintiff lacks standing to
enforce the copyright, that there is no proof that defendant copied,
that defendant copied only non-protected elements, that there were
no damages from defendant's copying and that fair use protected
defendant. Where fair use is often only one of many issues in
litigation, the predictability of its application may only be a minor
factor in whether the parties pursue the case or settle. It remains to
be seen whether fair use case law does in fact have regular patterns
that guide its application. Machine learning may be one way to find
that out.
IV. RENDERING DATA FOR FAIR USE MACHINE LEARNING

Machine learning techniques, with some notable exceptions,
rely on data."6 Key questions in applying machine learning to
address fair use issues are what data to employ and how to prepare
it. A number of sources could supply data. There are hundreds
of reported judicial opinions on fair use. But using those to train
software to predict fair use raises a number of issues. Comparison to
a prototypical1 7 machine application can highlight the issues.
A textbook example of machine learning is image
classification. A project to recognize pictures of cats is a classic."
96
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98

See, e.g., Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and
the FourthAmendment, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 871, 880 (2016) ("'Machine learning'
is part of a nest of concepts in the artificial intelligence arena, including 'data
mining,' 'knowledge discovery in databases,' and 'big data,' that are often
used interchangeably and confusingly in academia, government, and popular
media.").
Abdellatif Abdelfattah, Image Classificationusing Deep NeuralNetworks, MEDIUM
(July 27, 2017), https://medium.com/@tifa2up/image-classification-usingdeep-neural-networks-a-beginner-friendly-approach-using-tensorflow94bOaO9Occd4 ("We will build a deep neural network that can recognize
images with an accuracy of 78.4% while explaining the techniques used
throughout the process.").
See, e.g., id. (teaching example of deep neural network to recognize pictures of
cats).
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The project might start with a database of, say, 60,000 images."
The images would be tagged in advance, labeled as containing cats
or not containing cats. The images would then be preprocessed to
yield a form more convenient for machine learning. 100 Two common
ways would be to convert the image to greyscale (a numerical range
from white to black) or RGB values (giving the combination of
red, green, and blue). 101 The network would be trained on a subset
of the images (or in sequence on smaller subsets, to reduce the
computational demands) and then tested against a subset not used
in training. 10 2 If the accuracy is not satisfactory, adjustments could
be made and training repeated until a satisfactory level of accuracy
is met. Presented with a new image, the network would classify it
as a picture with or without a cat, perhaps with an assessment of
probability.
Where machine learning algorithms typically run on many
thousands, if not millions, of examples, the reported fair use cases
may prove to be a rather sparse data set. 103 Examples for a data
set of fair use cases could be compiled with some imagination.
Google sometimes presents a CAPTCHA to a user, showing several
images and requiring the user to check a box for each image that
contains a certain image, like a stop sign. 104 That may be a security
measure, but the classification may also be used in Google's image
recognition1 0s or self-driving car endeavors. For fair use, every
take-down notice presents a possible example. Although the takedown sender has implicitly labeled it as not fair use, it could also
be seen as an unlabeled example. The take-down procedure also
99 Id.
100 See GARON, supra note 2, at 59-68 (discussing preparing the data for machine
learning).
101 Abdelfattah, supra note 97.
102 GARON, supra note 2, at 29, 49-50 ("When you estimate the generalization
error using the test set, your estimate will be too optimistic and you will
launch a system that will not perform as well as expected. This is called data
snooping bias.").
103 Cf Beebe, supra note 53, at 550 (discussing an empirical study that found 306
"reported federal opinions that made substantial use of the section 107 fourfactor test for fair use through 2005").
104 See Dennis Goedegebuure, You Are Helping Google AI Image Recognition, MEDIUM
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://medium.com/@thenextcomer/you-are-helpinggoogle-ai-image-recognition-b24d89372b7e.
105 Id. The author heard a discussion of this at a talk by Jonathan Frankle, Machine
Learning and Neural Networks for Lawyers, Talk at the Boston University
School of Law and Hariri Institute for Computing (Oct. 31, 2018).
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allows the poster of content to require that the material be put
back up, pending resolution of the case. So a smaller number of
take-down/put-back-up examples could be grist for the data base.
YouTube now largely channels copyright holders to use YouTube's
Content ID system as an alternative to statutory take-down notices.
That system, and others like it, could likewise present a rich vein
of examples. Any site that has human moderators, vetters, or other
supervisors deciding whether to take down user content could be
a source of decisions on fair use, although the quality associated
with those samples would depend on such things as whether the
humans in question had training in the law or fair use specifically.
Getting those examples would not be easy, requiring cooperation
from the sites, which in turn could depend on the input of many
constituencies and consideration of legal issues, including whether
fair use authorized all that copying, distribution and adaptation of
copyrighted works. With some investment and preprocessing of
data, services like Amazon's Mechanical Turk could be used to have
nonlawyers classify cases as fair use or not fair use, or even to create
the cases. Those would not be borderline cases if the classifiers did
not have whatever fine legal reasoning skills might be required to
apply fair use. But a trove of clear cases could be helpful in training
a machine learning program. 106 In some respects, easy cases may be
better than close cases for programs to "learn" from.
Additional examples may be generated by automated means,
termed "dataset augmentation."1 0 7 In image classification, for

&

106 Other sources of data for legal applications may be unearthed with creativity.
The Learned Hands project of Suffolk University Law School's Legal Innovation
and Technology (LIT) Lab and the Stanford Legal Design Lab, created a data
set for classification machine learning on spotting legal issues from "75,000
legal questions posted on Reddit . .. dealing with family, consumer, criminal
and other legal issues." Jason Tashea, New Game Lets Players Train AI to Spot
Legal Issues, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 16, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/newgameletsplayers train ai and closethe_ justice gap.
107 GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 240, 259-60; see also E. Alpaydin
Fevzi Alimoglu, Pen-Based Recognition of Handwritten Digits Data Set, UNIV.
CAL. IRVINE MACH. LEARNING REPOSITORY, https://archive.ics.uci.edu/
ml/datasets/Pen-Based +Recognition+ of+ Handwritten+ Digits (last visited
Jun. 30, 2019) ("We create a digit database by collecting 250 samples from
44 writers. The samples written by 30 writers are used for training, crossvalidation and writer dependent testing . . ."); Mike Szczys, Machine Learning
Lets MicroDecode Your Handwriting, HACKADAY (May 3,2012), https://hackaday.
com/20 12/05/03/machine-learning-lets-micro-decode-your-handwriting/
("This rig will take the letters you write on the touchpad using a stylus and
turn them into digital characters. The system is very fast and displays near-
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example, one image can be used to generate multiple examples by
cropping the same image at different locations 1 s or with "random
translations, rotations, and in some cases, flips of the input." 109
Machine learning itself may generate additional examples. 110 If a
system has learned to identify features (such as concepts or classes of
objects), then a generative model can produce new, different examples
sharing the same features' but in a different arrangement. 112 For
perfect recognition. This is all thanks to a large data set that was gathered
through machine learning.").
108 GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 459-60.

109 Id.
110 Generative machine learning can be used to make examples more like reality.
Cloud Machine LearningEngine, GoOGLE, https://cloud.google.com/ml-engine/
(last visitedJune 30, 2019) (quoting Mathias Ortner) ("Google Cloud Machine
Learning Engine enabled us to improve the accuracy and speed at which we
correct visual anomalies in the images captured from our satellites. It solved a
problem that has existed for decades. It will allow Airbus Defence and Space
to continue to provide unrivaled access to the most comprehensive range of
commercial Earth observation data available today.").
111 Alex Graves, Generating Sequences with Recurrent Neural Networks, UNIV.
TORONTO at 1-2 (June 5, 2014), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1308.0850.pdf; see also
RecurrentNeural Network HandwritingGenerationDemo, https://www.cs.toronto.
edu/- graves/handwriting.html.
112 See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 540-43. In general, the ability

&

of machine learners to generate new works raises the issue, whether those
works are copyrightable and who would own the copyright. See Nina I. Brown,
Artificial Authors: A Casefor Copyright in Computer-GeneratedWorks, 20 COLUM.
Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2018) (presenting "an argument for recognizing
copyrights in computer-generated works"); Lin Weeks, Media Law andCopyright
Implications of Automated journalism, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 67,
93 (2014) ("Where a strict moral conception of copyright might assert that
all Polaroid photographs owe dependency to Edwin H. Land,104 or that the
creator of an algorithm has a claim in everything that algorithm output, our
current pecuniary conception values the promulgation of technologies into
more and newer works."); Jessica Fjeld & Mason Kortz, A Legal Anatomy of
Al-generated Art: Part I, HARV. J. L. & TECH.: JOLT DIG. (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/a-legal-anatomy-of-ai-generated-artpart-i; Daniel J. Gervais, The Machine as Author, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (manuscript at 283, 285) (on file with authors); Jane C. Ginsburg
Luke Ali Budiardio, Authors and Machines (Colum. Pub. L. Res., Paper No. 14597, 2018). The technology also raises issues of false works. See Mark Gibbs,
MachineLearningand Forgery, NETWORK WORLD (Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.
networkworld.com/article/3109557/software/machine-learning-and-forgery.
html ('A new algorithm from University College London researchers creates
forged handwritten text that never was . . ."); Douglas Harris, Deepfakes: False
Pornography is Here and the Law Cannot Protect You, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.

99 (2019). But see Alex Hern, Google Says Machine Learning is the Future. So I
Tried it Myself: If Deep Learning Will Be as Big as the Internet, It's Time for Everyone
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lawyers, this reminds us of the Socratic approach of slightly changing
the facts of hypotheticals, but also reminds us of the need to develop
systems that can identify facts and legal concepts within source
material.
If the data available for fair use is somewhat limited, that
increases the importance of considering the various algorithms
discussed below. Where there is a huge amount of data to train the
algorithm, then the various types of machine learning algorithms tend
to approach the same level of performance, at least in theory.113 With
smaller data sets, the type of algorithm becomes more important.1 14
In the abstract, fair use is a classification problem: case
of fair use or not fair use? But the data are less squarely defined.
An image classifier is trained on a set of images, then attempts to
classify images, all presented in the same format. A fair use case
could be in any media (images, songs, pantomimes, architectural
blueprints, etc.). Fair use does not depend only on examining the
work. Rather, it would involve comparing the relevant work to
the copyrighted work (what elements were used and were those
elements themselves protected by copyright), then considering a
number of factors extrinsic to the work (the purpose of the use, the
effect on the market). In addition, fair use depends on comparison
to precedent, so the learner could be trained on the facts in the case
law. In short, the potential data to be considered are much more
variegated than the typical machine learning application.
One key determination might be at what level of abstraction
we define the features for the program to operate on.11 s One could
think of fair use determinations as strictly comparing the instant
case to the factors as determined in other cases. In other words, a
case presenting the same set of factors should be decided the same
way as precedent cases presenting the same set of factors. At the

113

to Start Looking Closely at It, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 28, 2016), https://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/28/google-says-machine-learning-isthe- future-so-i-tried-it-myself (discussing an unsuccessful attempt to use
machine learning, trained with vast amounts of The Guardian, to synthesize
possible headlines from a "parallel universe").
See GER6N, supra note 2, at 23 (discussing Michele Banko & Eric Brill, Scaling
to Very Very Large Corporafor NaturalLanguage Disambiguation and Peter Norvig
et al., The UnreasonableEffectiveness of Data).

114 Id.
115

See generally ALICE
FOR MACHINE

ZHENG & AMANDA CASARI, FEATURE ENGINEERING

LEARNING:

PRINCIPLES AND

TECHNIQUES FOR DATA

SCIENTISTS (Rachel Roumeliotis & Jeff Bleidel eds., 2018).
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other end, viewing fair use as ultimately a determination on the facts
of particular cases, one could disregard the factors and concentrate
solely on the facts. If a case is most similar to a precedent case on
similar relevant facts, then it should be decided in the same way.
The second approach would likely require a larger set of features to
accommodate the broad range of fact settings in fair use cases.
One reason to define the features broadly is to avoid the
hazard of overfitting. Overfitting, in machine learning as in statistics,
occurs when the learner fits the function to the data, only too
well.116 The concept of overfitting is quite similar to the hazard in
legal reasoning of tying a rule too closely to the facts of a case. For
example, if a learner were trained only on music cases, including
Campbell, it could include in its function that one required element is
that the work be a musical work. One guard against overfitting is to
include more examples in training. Another is testing the function
against other test examples.1 1 7 The model would fail when tested
against examples where fair use applied in non-music cases. Another
way to guard against overfitting is simply to use fewer features. If
all the example cases happened to be music cases but that element
was not included as a feature (or inferable from other features), then
overfitting to music would be much less likely.' 8
Another way to reduce the number of dimensions is to
preprocess the data. Unsupervised machine learning may be used to
find clusters, which can be used as the data for supervised machine
learning, such as classification.11 ' It may become possible to use
machine learning to put the examples into categories, such as the
elements of the relevant works, upon which other programs may
learn to classify the examples. 12 0 Copyright law itself supplies the
relevant principles, like Learned Hand's abstractions test, used to
determine whether a second author copied unprotected ideas or
protected expression:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great
number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
116 GER6N, supra note 2, at 26-28.

117 See, e.g., id. at 29 ("The only way to know how well a model will generalize to
new cases is to actually try it out on new cases.").
118 Id. at 302-10 (discussing techniques to avoid overfitting).
119

DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 211 ("Machine learners call this process

dimensionality reduction because it reduces a large number of visible
dimensions (the pixels) to a few implicit ones (expression, facial features.").
120 Id. at 210.
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equally well, as more and more of the incident is left
out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a
point in this series of abstractions where they are
no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright
could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' [sic] to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never
extended. 121
Hand's characterization is echoed by the use of machine learning
to group data into conceptually linked groups. Unsupervised learning
can be used to find clusters within material, which in turn can be
treated as objects which can be grouped into more abstract clusters. 12 2
The technique is already used in "topic extraction," to find the themes
being discussed in a collection of text documents, 123 which would be
a start toward characterizing the components of legal documents like
judicial opinions.
Data may also be stored in more efficient structures,
depending on its characteristics. A technique with resonance for
legal reasoning is "distributed representation." 12 4 Rather than
identifying each feature independently, features can be identified by
a set of shared attributes. "Cat" and "dog" are quite different but
can be associated by a number of shared attributes (fur, four legs,
etc.). 125 Legal reasoning often depends on finding the similarities
between fact patterns, and so would seem amenable to that sort
of representation. In particular, fact patterns (or policy issues)
may be similar in the sense of "family resemblance," where there
is no common core that two items share, but rather overlapping
characteristics. 12 6
121

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 E2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citing
Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 E2d 694, (2d
Cir. 1929)).

122

DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 210.
See ANDREAS C. MOLLER & SARAH GUIDO, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE
LEARNING WITH PYTHON: A GUIDE FOR DATA SCIENTISTS 131 (Dawn

123

124

Schanafelt ed., 2017) ("Here, the task is to find the unknown topics that
are talked about in each document, and to learn what topics appear in each
document.").
See, e.g., GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 548-54.

125 Id. at 550.
126 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REv. 551, 55178 (2010) (discussing legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin's use of "family
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A number of projects, including in areas other than machine
learning, have attempted to structure legal material in a way that
would facilitate computer processing at a higher conceptual level. It
might be possible to render data into useful forms for processing by
using tagging, which could be done, in turn, by software. 127 Research
projects have attempted such tagging at a conceptual level, which
would both make the tag's features for learning and also reduce
the number of features, by combining similar facts into a single
concept. 128 Cases could be annotated, ideally by automated means,
to provide a common data structure. 129 In the area of contracts,
resemblance,"

which comes

from Ludwig Wittgenstein's, Philosophical

Investigations).
127 Kyoko Sugisaki, Supertagging for Domain Adaptation: An Approach with Law
Texts,

in

SIXTEENTH

INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE

ON ARTIFICIAL

supra note 40, at 249 ('Abstract: In this paper,
we present a German supertagger that analyses syntactic functions in linear
order. We apply a statistical sequential model, conditional random fields
(CRF), to Swiss law texts, in a real world scenario in which the training
data of the domain is missing. We show that the small amount of in-domain
training data that was informed by linguistic hard and soft constraints and
domain constraints achieved a label accuracy of 90% in the domain data, thus
outperforming state-of-the-art parsers.").
128 See Matthias Grabmair et al., Introducing LUIMA: An Experiment in Legal
Conceptual Retrieval of Vaccine Injury Decisions Using a UIMA Type System and
Tools, in FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
AND
LAW
69 (2015), https://dl.acm.org/citation.
cfm?id=2746090 ("This paper presents first results from a proof of feasibility
experiment in conceptual legal document retrieval in a particular domain
(involving vaccine injury compensation). The conceptual markup of documents
is done automatically using LUIMA, a law-specific semantic extraction
toolbox based on the UIMA framework. The system consists of modules for
automatic sub-sentence level annotation, machine learning based sentence
annotation, basic retrieval using Apache Lucene and a machine learning
based reranking of retrieved documents. In a leave-one-out experiment on a
limited corpus, the resulting rankings scored higher for most tested queries
than baseline rankings created using a commercial full-text legal information
system."); see also Milagro Teruel et al., A Low-Cost, High-Coverage Legal
Named Entity Recognizer, Classifier and Linker, in SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, supra note 40, at
9-18 ("In this paper we try to improve Information Extraction in legal texts
by creating a legal Named Entity Recognizer, Classifier and Linker. With this
tool, we can identify relevant parts of texts and connect them to a structured
knowledge representation, the LKIF ontology.").
129 See, e.g., Vern R. Walker et al., Semantic Types for Computational Legal
Reasoning: Propositional Connectives and Sentence Roles in the Veterans' Claims
Dataset, in SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, supra note 40, at 217-26 (2017) ("This paper
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW,
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efforts have been made to identify common elements which would
facilitate creation of software to handle such matters as drafting and
interpretation, 13 0 although presently the wide variation in language
makes the job of annotation best handled by humans, which is
laborious.131 Professor McCarty, long a leader in artificial intelligence
and the law, has suggested that the building blocks of legal reasoning
may be identified through machine learning, analogous to how
machine learning has mimicked the way human vision identifies
objects, such as faces. 13 2
Another question would be whether the facts used to make
the prediction of fair use should be limited to legally relevant facts.
Political scientists have had considerable success in predicting the
outcome of Supreme Court cases by considering such factors as
ideological direction (liberal or conservative) of the lower court
ruling and the general nature of the case - factors which the Court
announces the creation and public availability of a dataset of annotated
decisions adjudicating claims by military veterans for disability compensation
in the United States. This is intended to initiate a collaborative, transparent
approach to semantic analysis for argument mining from legal documents.").
130 See Kathryn D. Betts & Kyle R. Jaep, The Dawn of Fully Automated Contract
Drafting:Machine LearningBreathesNew Life into a Decades-oldPromise, 15 DUKE
L. & TECH. REv. 216, 227 (2017).
131 See Silviu Pitis. Methods for Retrieving Alternative Contract Language Using a
Prototype, in SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, supra note 40, at 277; Sugisaki, supra note 127,
at 249 ("Under these circumstances, the best approach is the manual
annotation of a large amount of new domain data in which a parser can be
trained. However, this is also the most cost-intensive solution."); Matias
Garcia-Constantino et al., CLIEL: Context-Based Information Extraction from
Commercial Law Documents, in SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, supra note 40, at 79; Illias
Chalkidis, Ion Androutsopoulos & Achilleas Michos, Extracting Contract
Elements, in SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, supranote 40, at 19.
132 See L. Thorne McCarty, How to Ground A Language for Legal Discourse in A
Prototypical Perceptual Semantics, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REv. 511, 526 (2016)
("We can now address the title of this talk: How to Ground a Languagefor Legal
Discourse in a Prototypical Perceptual Semantics. Specifically, we will see how
to use the machinery of manifold learning and deep learning to define a
semantics for a logical language. Why do I call this a 'prototypical perceptual
semantics'? Well, it's a prototypical semantics because it is based on my model
of prototypical clusters, as we will see. Why is it a prototypical perceptual
semantics? Well, notice that our primary examples are drawn from the field of
image processing, and therefore, if we can build a logic on these foundations,
we will have a plausible account of how human cognition could be grounded in
human perception.").
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itself would of course deem irrelevant.13 3 If the purpose is to predict
how a court would decide a fair use case, then similarly one might
include factors with no legal relevance but which have been shown
to have predictive value. That, however, would make the potential
facts include not just the relevant works and the fair use case law,
but facts about the case law. Some statistical approaches would
remain within the boundaries of judicial opinions, although relying
on features that are not relevant to the legal analysis of fair use.
For example, one project sought to use an even sparser statistical
approach, examining whether the waxing and waning of "mimetic"
phrases in judicial opinions might be used to predict likelihood
of dissents. 13 4 Use of such "predictive analytics," rather than legal
analysis, to predict cases may, however, undercut the value of the
rule of law.135
The sources of data would include reported fair use cases.
But that might be insufficient for some varieties of machine learning,
reflecting a general need in machine learning. For many techniques,
a machine learner can learn only with training examples. A catrecognizing learner needs oodles of pictures, some of cats, some not,
each labeled. Those thousands or millions of pictures need to be
obtained. That may be done with web-crawling softwarel36 (although
133 See Theodore W. Ruger et al., Essay, The Supreme Court ForecastingProject:Legal
and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1150 (2004) ("For every argued case during the 2002
Term, we obtained predictions of the outcome prior to oral argument using two
methods--one a statistical model that relies on general case characteristics, and
the other a set of independent predictions by legal specialists. The basic result
is that the statistical model did better than the legal experts in forecasting the
outcomes of the Term's cases: The model predicted 75% of the Court's affirm/
reverse results correctly, while the experts collectively got 59.1% right.").
134 Verma et al., supra note 40, at 253 ("In addition to the dissents, we analyze
the notion of memetic phrases occurring in opinions - phrases that see a small
spark of popularity but eventually die out in usage - and try to correlate them
to dissent.").
135 Frank A. Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion,and the jurisprudence
of Behaviourism, 68 U. TORONTO L.J. 63 (2018).
136 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 8, at 1095-96 ('Another concern is that algorithms
that analyze fair use will fail to process information that is external to the
content itself. For instance, determining the nature of use may require
external information and additional analysis of facts. Yet, algorithms could be
programmed to extract and analyze data from external sources. For instance,
educational use might be determined based on tagging the nature of the
user. A program could detect the type of user (e.g., educational institution,
governmental agency) based on the domain name (e.g., .edu, .gov) or by
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that raises the issue of whether fair use protects making copies of
images to use in machine learning).137 The pictures also have to be
labeled. That cannot be done automatically if no cat-recognizing
learner has been built yet. The common alternative is simply to have
humans view the pictures and label them, a labor-intensive process.
Machine learning is often cited for its potential to displace humans
from repetitious jobs, but it is also creating many repetitious jobs
with its need for labeled data.138
The ultimate question may be whether fair use via machine
learning is a project more like Cyc or like Google Translate. Cyc
attempted to support knowledge engineering by building a database
with as many facts as possible about the world, only to find the
store of facts inexhaustible.13 9 Google Translate took on machine
translation, which might seem to require an equally daunting task:
taking on all the possible sentences which might talk about facts
(and much more).

140

It turned out that dealing with the meaning

of sentences was unnecessary. 1 41 Google Translate, trained on a vast
corpus of translations conveniently compiled by the United Nations
in the course of its affairs, handles translation an entire sentence at
a time, having learned on previous sentence translation. 14 2 A legal
137

.

138

checking registration in external databases.").
See Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence's
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REv. 579, 622-25 (2018) (arguing that
fair use should apply because "[ulsing copyrighted works as training data
for AI systems is highly transformative"); Benjamin L. W Sobel, Artificial
Intelligence's Fair Use Crisis, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45, 97 (2017) (discussing
policy arguments on both sides of the issue of whether fair use should protect
the use of copies of work during machine learning).
Matthew Hutson, The Future of AI Depends on a Huge Workforce of Human
Teachers, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-09-07/the-future-of-ai-depends-on-a-huge-workforce-ofhuman-teachers ("For an autonomous car to recognize pedestrians and stop
signs, it's typically fed thousands or millions of photos, all hand-labeled. To
nail a conversation, a digital assistant needs to be told over and over when it's
failed. And so Rubin spends 10 to 30 hours a week on her phone or computer
evaluating search results and chat retorts through a site called Clickworker.
. . All together, more than 1 million people around the world are chipping in,
one click at a time.").
DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 35 ("Thirty years later, Cyc continues to grow
without end in sight, and commonsense reasoning still eludes it. Ironically,
Lenat has belatedly embraced populating Cyc by mining the web, not because
Cyc can read, but because there's no other way.").
See Wu, supra note 6, at 2, 20.
Id. at 13, 17-18.
See Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening: How Google Used Artificial
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141
142
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case is not as modular as a task in translation because the sentences
are interdependent. The question will be whether the necessary
features for machine learning can be extracted from legal texts
(or from examples of fair use in other media, like images).14 3 The
domain of law faces an issue recognized to be one of the key areas
of machine learning research, which is finding a way to represent
semantic knowledge: in technical terms, a "research frontier is to
develop embeddings for phrases and for relations between words and
facts."1 4 4 The succeeding sections rest on the hopeful assumption
that some progress will be made in providing the data necessary for
using machine learning in the context of legal reasoning. 1 4
V. SUPERVISED LEARNING WITH NEURAL NETWORKS: LEARNING
TO RECOGNIZE FAIR USE
14
Following the classification by Professor Domingos,6
machine learning can be divided into several schools. 1 47 The school
presently making the most notable progress, artificial neural networks

Intelligence to Transform Google Translate, One of Its More Popular Services - and
How Machine Learning is Poised to Reinvent Computing Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-aiawakening.html.
143 As an indication of the pervasive issue of extracting conceptual information
from legal texts, see Call for Participation: Competition on Legal Information
Extraction/Entailment(COLIEE), INT'L CONF.
& L.,

144
145

146
147

ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

https://nms.kcl.ac.uk/icail20l7/cfcoliee.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2019)
("There are two tasks in the competition. One is to extract articles from
Japanese civil codes which contribute to solving a bar exam yes/no question;
the second task is to check entailment of a question from given civil code
article(s). We also provide various NLP tools' outputs for training data to help
your information retrieval and textual entailment.").
GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 484.
Note that judicial reform could improve the availability of data generally in
the legal system. See David Colarusso & Erika J. Rickard, Speaking the Same
Language:Data Standards andDisruptive Technologies in the Administration ofJustice,
50 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 387, 388 (2017) ("[E]stablishing data standards for
electronically sharing information across the justice system would propel
existing technological innovations to greater prominence and effectiveness.").
See generally DOMINGOS, supra note 2.
One could divide machine learning more broadly, such as between instancebased and versus model-based learning. GARON, supra note 2, at 17. The
former "learns the examples by heart, then generalizes to new cases using
a similarity measure." Id. The latter builds "a model of these examples, then
use[s] that model to make predictions." Id. at 18. One can see the analogy
to legal reasoning, which can be viewed as case-based or as applying general
rules which may be derived from cases or set out in statutes.
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(including deep learning), is an approach inspired by the networks
of neurons comprising the brain, although now they are "generally
not designed to be realistic models of biological function.""

A

connected network of virtual nodes is adjusted to respond to
experience: "[b]y adding more layers and more units within a layer,
a deep network can represent functions of increasing complexity."1 4 1
Such deep learning has found successful application in a number of
areas, such as machine vision, 1 0 speech recognition,s' handwriting
recognition 5 2 and natural language processing.153 Deep learning
networks are in broad use in a number of other fields, potentially
anywhere there is ample data. 154
The model receives a set of input values and gives a set of
output values. 5 5 The weights of the various nodes are adjusted until
the desired output values for each input are received."' Just how to
adjust those weights, of course, is the key to whether the network
can learn as intended. 1 7 The first wave of network learners, in the
1950s and 1960s, including the Perceptron, went under the name
of "cybernetics." 5 ' The leading algorithm employed was "stochastic
gradient descent."15 9 Gradient descent has been compared to
148
149
150
151
152

GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 13.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 452-57.
Id. at 458-60.
Stephen Wu & Justin Churchill, Touchpad Figure Recognition, CORNELL U.
ELECTRICAL & COMPUTER ENGINEERING (Spring 2012), http://people.
ece.cornell.edu/land/courses/ece4760/FinalProjects/s2012/shw46jec324/
shw46jec324/index.html ("Our project implements a touchpad input system
which takes user input and converts it to a printed character. Currently, the
device only recognizes the 26 letters of the alphabet, but our training system
could be easily generalized to include any figure of completely arbitrary shape,
including alphanumerics, punctuation, and other symbols.").

153

GOODFELLOW

ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 461-477.

154 One commentator listed inspirational deep learning applications: "1.
Colorization of black and white images. 2. Adding sounds to silent movies.
3. Automatic machine translation. 4. Object classification in photographs. 5.
Automatic handwriting generation. 6. Character text generation. 7. Image
caption generation. 8. Automatic game playing." Jason Brownlee, 8Inspirational
Applications of Deep Learning, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (July 14,
2016), https://machinelearningmastery.com/inspirational-applications-deeplearning/.
155 DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 108.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 109-11.
158 GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 13-15.
159 Id. at 15.
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descending from a mountain. 16 0 If the hiker takes the steepest
path down from any given point, she will continue to descend the
mountain to the bottom, unless stuck in local minimum, a spot
from where all paths go up.16 1 The second wave, "connectionism,"
overcame limitations of the first wave, linear models. 16 2 Backpropagation techniques adjusted for errors throughout the network,
allowing networks to learn more complex functions.163 Distributed
representation permitted more efficient representation of concepts
within networks and gave greater power to compare multiple
attributes of concepts. 16 4 The third wave, deep learning, uses some
new software techniques, such as "greedy layer-wise pretraining," to
create deeper networks with greater learning power.6 s But the new
deep learning networks continue to use decades-old techniques such
as gradient descent and back-propagation.16 6 Much of the increased
power of machine learning in this era of deep learning comes
from the general development of computer network capability and
deployment, along with availability of much larger sets of data.1 7
Datasets used to train networks are exponentially larger than in
past decades. The Street View House Numbers dataset, for example,
includes over 600,000 images, and other datasets include up to
"tens of millions of examples."16 8 The computing resources devoted
to deep learning are correspondingly extensive, both with respect
to hardware' and software to run training software over a large
160 DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 291-92.

161 Id. at 110.
162 GOODFELLOW

ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 14-15, 18.

163 Id. at 15-18 (noting limitation of linear models and development of
backpropagation).
164 Id. at 150, 541.
165 Id. at 18-19.
166 Id. at 14-15, 18-19.
167 See, e.g., id. at 461 (discussing how increases in computing resources enables
improvements in using neural nets in speech recognition: "Later, with much
larger and deeper models and much larger datasets, recognition accuracy was
dramatically improved by using neural networks to replace [Gaussian Mixture
Models] for the task of associating acoustic features to phonemes.").
168 Id. at 19-22.
169 See id. at 445-47 ("Because the size of neural networks is of paramount
importance, deep learning requires high performance hardware and software
infrastructure."). Goodfellow describes progress from using fast central
processing unit implementation to use of graphics processing units (GPUs).
Id. ("Together, this results in graphics cards having been designed to have a
high degree of parallelism and high memory bandwidth," which fit well with
the needs for deep learning.).
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network of computers. 170

A network responds to training examples and responds
with its output to the classification question (such as "cat," or "not
cat"). The network then receives feedback on whether the response
was correct and adjusts its internal weights accordingly. When the
network is performing with the training examples to a satisfactory
level, it can then be tested on a different set of examples. This
reconfiguration of the network can be seen several different ways. In
one sense, the network has adjusted in response to feedback on its
performance, hence it has "learned." Put in terms of mathematics
(which can be seen as the art of detecting patterns), the network
now has determined responses to various types of examples, so it
has configured a function. Put another way, the network has reified
an algorithm to perform that function, so the network has written
a computer program. This characterization captures one great
advantage of machine learning: rather than having a person write a
program to recognize pictures of cats (which may be too detailed a
task for humans), the network itself writes the program, in a sense.
The program will not mirror the human thought process
- that is well-illustrated by the concept of "generative adversarial
networks."1 7 1 Suppose a network has attained a high success rate
on identifying pictures of cats. Another machine learning program
could run on the output of the cat classifier, identify which features it
deems salient, and produce "adversarial examples." 172 It might take
a picture of a cat and change only a few key pixels so that a human
would still readily identify it as a picture of a cat. The cat classifier
would be fooled by the small change to classify it as not a picture
of a cat. Generative adversarial networks remind us that machine
learning may accomplish certain tasks with high proficiency, but
that does not mean it has formed robust human concepts like "cat"
applicable in many contexts. 173
170 See id. at 448-49 ("In many cases, the computational resources available on a
single machine are insufficient. We therefore want to distribute the workload
of training and inference across many machines.").
171 Id. at 546-47 ("In this approach, a generative model is trained to fool a
feedforward classifier.").
172 Id. at 268-69.
173 Generative adversarial networks pose practical security and reliability issues
for the use of machine learning, and software generally, in a number of
contexts. See Cory Doctorow, Generative adversarialnetwork produces a "universal
fingerprint" that will unlock many smartphones, BOING BOING (Nov. 15, 2018)
(citing PHILIP BONTRAGER ET AL., DEEPMASTERPRINTS: GENERATING
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Neural networks in the brain inspired, by analogy, artificial
neural networks.1 7 4 There is another analogy between the idea of a
network learning through exposure to examples, with feedback, and
the process of the common law. Edward Levi's classic An Introduction
to Legal Reasoning described the course of common law rule
development as courts formulating rules to explain the outcomes of
cases such that a rule could be altered when it could no longer yield
a just result, and so would be changed accordingly. 17s That resonates
with the process of artificial neural networks, when the feedback
from the outcome causes the nodes in the network to change their
weights until gradually the outcome may be different from a similar
case. Ronald Dworkin has likewise described the concept of the
common law gradually adjusting as it is challenged by case after
case.17 As some legal theorists view jurisprudence, drawing on the
work ofJohn Rawls, an ideal judge considers all relevant matter until
the judge reaches a state of reflective equilibrium.1 7 7 An artificial
neural network can be trained until it reaches a state of equilibrium
with the training set of cases. In fair use in particular, the broad fourfactor rule requires cases to give it content.
One issue would be acquiring sufficient cases to train the
network. Deep learning has achieved impressive results in part due
to the use of big data sets: "[a]s of 2016, a rough rule of thumb
is that a supervised deep learning algorithm will generally achieve
acceptable performance with around 5,000 labeled examples per
MASTERPRINTS

EVOLUTION
html.

FOR DICTIONARY

(2018)),

ATTACKS

VIA

LATENT

VARIABLE

https://boingboing.net/2018/11/15/masterprints.

174 See, e.g., GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 13 (internal citation omitted)

("Some of the earliest learning algorithms we recognize today were intended
to be computational models of biological learning, i.e. models of how learning
happens or could happen in the brain ... While the kinds of neural networks
used for machine learning have sometimes been used to understand brain
function, they are generally not designed to be realistic models of biological
function.").
175 Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501,
501-03 (1948).
176 See Michael Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REV. 835, 891 (2012) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 400
(1986)) ("This claim is, of course, largely similar to the argument that the
rules of society 'work themselves pure' through common law judicial decision
making.").
177 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 069: Reflective Equilibrium, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (May 15, 2011) https://1solum.typepad.com/legaltheory
lexicon/2011/05/legal-theory-lexicon-069-reflective-equilibrium.html.
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category, and will match or exceed human performance when trained
with a dataset containing at least 10 million labeled examples."1 7 1
The lower threshold of 5,000 examples might be met simply by using
reported fair use cases augmented as discussed above, but would
fall short of the 10 million required to match human performance.
For some purposes, "acceptable performance" could suffice where
the stakes are relatively low. In addition, human performance might
not be as high a standard in classifying fair use cases as in, say,
recognizing pictures of cats or celebrities. Humans appear to have a
natural facility for recognizing faces. With fair use, as noted above,
humans often disagree.
Assigning weight to cases used to train the network presents
another issue. Sony, Harper & Row, and Campbell are just three of
thousands of reported Supreme Court cases, but they are the
governing precedent on how to interpret fair use. Other cases from
the lower courts, in legal theory, simply serve to interpret the big
three - or if they precede the big three, have diminished precedential
value, because a subsequent Supreme Court case would have more
precedential value than an earlier lower court opinion. That is
viewing things through the lens of jurisprudence. One could also
view the reported cases as simply a sample of how judges view fair
use, as a means to predict the outcome of future cases. Through
that lens, the big three might be accorded more weight but would
not dominate. Indeed, perhaps some lower court case better predicts
how fair use will be applied in the future.
Along the same lines, one could argue about whether certain
cases should be excluded from the sets, either as training examples
or test examples. The lower court opinions reversed by the Supreme
Court would seem inapt examples to train our fair use learner. Less
clear would be the many district court opinions that have been
reversed by courts of appeals. Some of those very likely might have
been affirmed by a different set of judges. Along the same lines, one
could select a good number of fair use cases, especially predating
Sony that might be decided differently today.
As noted above, a challenge for using machine learning in
fair use (or any legal domain including cases) is likely to be the curse
of dimensionality - the considerable number of variables that could
enter into legal analysis. Networks do have some techniques to
178 GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 19-20; see also Frank Fagan, Big Data
Legal Scholarship:Towards a ResearchAgenda and a Practitioner'sGuide, 20 VA. J. L.
& TECH. 1 (2016) (discussing applications of big data in the law).
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reduce dimensionality. One of the most powerful is the autoencoder.
An autoencoder takes a set of inputs and puts out the same set of
inputs - which sounds pretty mundane.

The key is to make the hidden layer much smaller
than the input and output layers, so the network
can't just learn to copy the input to the hidden layer
and the hidden layer to the output, in which case we
may as well throw the whole thing out. But if the
hidden layer is small, something interesting happens:
the network is forced to encode the input in fewer
bits, so it can be represented in the hidden layer, and
then decode those bits back to full size.17 9
Autoencoders thus find more efficient ways to represent data.
They find many uses in machine learning and have independent
applications in other areas, such as data compression. 1s0 In natural
language processing, an area which will be required to use judicial
opinions as data, networks have used autoencoders in such
applications in as word embeddings, machine translation, document
clustering, sentiment analysis and paraphrase detection."'*
Autoencoders can be stacked on top of each other, so that
each one uses the output of the previous autoencoder. The first
autoencoder can encode features at one level of abstraction, meaning
the next autoencoder can encode features slightly more abstract. In
image recognition, one level could be edges, one could be edges that
are part of facial features, the next could be entire features like noses
or mouths, and the top layer could identify entire faces. Indeed, the
Google Brain network used stacked autoencoders and other network
components to recognize cats. 18 2 By analogy (while recognizing
the gulf between these domains), autoencoders could be used to
179 DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 116.
180 Cf Cory Doctorow, Compression Could be Machine Learning's "Killer App," BO I NG
BoING (Oct. 18, 2018) https://boingboing.net/2018/10/18/narrativesensors.html.
181 See Venkata Krishna Jonnalagadda, Sparse, Stacked and VariationalAutoencoder,
MEDIUM
(Dec.
5,
2018)
https://medium.com/@venkatakrishna.
jonnalagadda/sparse-stacked-and-variational-autoencoder-efe5bfe73b64;
see
also Muller & Guido, supra note 123, at 131-32 ("Clustering algorithms, on the
other hand, partition data into distinct groups of similar items.").
182 DoMINGOS, supranote 2, at 117; Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The GreatA.I. Awakening,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/
magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html.
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recognize the features of fact patterns.
Another technique that could deal with abstraction is the
convolutional neural network. Convolutional neural networks can
abstract local features from examples.183 The best-known application
of convolutional neural networks may be in recognizing items in
images.1 14 Fair use analysis, as noted above, necessarily requires
taking bare facts and reducing them with abstractions in order to
apply the factors.
Evaluating the performance of the software would be both
vital and vexing. Whether a use is fair use or not is often subject
to disagreement.ss In law, the assessment goes beyond the result
to evaluating the reasoning supporting the result. One of the
greatest policy issues with machine learning is that many (not all, as
discussed below) algorithms are black boxes."' A network has been
reconfigured, effectively writing an algorithm to classify examples,
but the algorithm is far too complicated to simply read and evaluate.
Some applications apply several machine learning algorithms to the
same problem,1 7 and then seek the best answer by comparing the
183
184

185

See SEAN GERRISH, How SMART MACHINES THINK 135-39 (2018).

See, e.g., id. at 135 ("This pattern - convolutional layers followed by fully
connected layers - turns out to be very common in networks used for image
recognition.").
Some have called in general for more rigorous evaluation of AI and the law
projects. See Jack G. Conrad & John Zeleznikow, The Role of Evaluation in AI and
Law, 15 INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. PROC. 181, 18186 (2015); compare Richard Tromans, FranceBans Judge Analytics, ARTIFICIAL

LAW. (June 4, 2019) https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2019/06/04/france-

186

bans-judge-analytics-5-years-in-prison-for-rule-breakers/
("In a startling
intervention that seeks to limit the emerging litigation analytics and prediction
sector, the French Government has banned the publication of statistical
information about judges' decisions - with a five year prison sentence set as
the maximum punishment for anyone who breaks the new law."), with Daniel
L. Chen, Machine Learning and the Rule of Law, 2019 SANTA FE INST. PRESS
(forthcoming) https://ssrn.com/abstract= 3302507 ("Predictive judicial
analytics holds the promise of increasing the fairness of law.").
McJohn, Artificial Legal Intelligence, supra note 1, at 244 ('Applied to the legal
domain, a neural network would give a result without the reasons for it - a
'black-box' approach that fits poorly with the need for justifications in the
legal world."); see also Roger A. Ford & W Nicholson Price II, Privacy and
Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. 1,

18-21 (2016).
187

See GARON, supra note 2, at 181-83 (discussing Ensemble Learning);
GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 452 (discussing "mixture of experts"
approach).
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various answers from the several algorithms, which would make it
even more opaque as to what the cause of the result was."' The
potential of undisclosed bias is pervasive in machine learning (indeed,
machine learning necessarily requires some bias, in a statistical sense,
in the data)"I and other software. It has been raised in areas from
credit-scoring to criminal sentencing. Bias can enter in through
the operation of the algorithm (such as incorporating biases in
the data) but also through the human-guided process of bringing
machine learning to bear on a program. The software is not simply
set loose. Rather, the software may be trained on a set of data, then
the performance will be evaluated 9 o and improvements sought.'
The evaluation by humans can allow for some biases to creep in.
This area is one of intense interest, and means to make
algorithms more transparent may be in the making. But until
then, deployment of a fair use algorithm in some contexts (such
as where it prevented material from being publicly disseminated)
without grounds would raise considerable questions (especially if
the government were involved).
One related network learning technique deserves mentioning.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in applying machine learning to the
domain of law, as discussed above, is the need for sufficient data and
for that data to come in a form amenable to the various techniques
of machine learning. Neural networks in particular function better
the greater the number of training examples are available. 19 2 A recent
188 See DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 237 ("As it turns out, it's not hard to combine
many different learners into one, using what is known as metalearning.
Netflix, Watson, Kinect, and countless others use it, and it's one of the most
powerful arrows in the machine learner's quiver.").
189 See id. at 64 ("Tom Mitchell, a leading symbolist, calls it 'the futility of biasfree learning.' In ordinary life, bias is a pejorative word: preconceived notions
are bad. But in machine learning, preconceived notions are indispensable; you
can't learn without them.").
190 See GARON, supra note 2, at 71-74 (giving practical example of evaluation of a
machine learning model's performance).
191 See, e.g., id. at 253-306 (chapter on Model Evaluation and Improvement). As
the comic xkcd put it:
"This your machine learning system?
Yup! You pour the data into this big pile of linear algebra, then collect
the answers on the other side.
What if the answers are wrong?
Just stir the pile until they start looking right."
Randall Adams, Machine Learning, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/1838/.
192 See, e.g., GERRISH, supra note 183, at 143 ('As a result, they ended up with
2,000 times the amount of training data they started with, or about 2 billion
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project, published in the journal Science in December 2018, provided
an important exception to that rule. 193 Computer programs have been
superior to humans in playing chess for many years now.19 4 In general,
those programs - such as the IBM's Deep Blue that defeated chess
champion Gary Kasparov in 1997 - relied on learning using many
thousands of human-played games as examples, along with heuristics
programmed in. 195 AlphaZero, by contrast, was given no more domain
knowledge than the rules of chess."' It generated its own example
games. As Deep Mind put it:
To learn each game, an untrained neural network
plays millions of games against itself via a process
of trial and error called reinforcement learning. At
first, it plays completely randomly, but over time the
system learns from wins, losses, and draws to adjust
the parameters of the neural network, making it more
likely to choose advantageous moves in the future.1 17
After about nine hours of training, AlphaZero was superior to
any other computer chess program. "In one game, AlphaZero made
a bold bishop sacrifice, sometimes used to gain positional advantage,
followed by a queen sacrifice, which seemed like a colossal blunder
until it led to a check mate many moves later that neither Stockfish
nor humans saw coming."1 9 8

193

194
195
196

197
198

images with which to train their network. If they hadn't augmented their
training data like this, they would have needed to use a much smaller-and
less expressive-network.").
See generally, David Silver et al., A General Reinforcement LearningAlgorithm that
Masters Chess, shogi, and Go Through Self-Play, 362 SCIENCE 1140 (Dec. 7,
2018).
See generally, MONTY NEWBORN, KASPAROV VERSUS DEEP BLUE:
COMPUTER CHESS COMES OF AGE (1997).
Id.
David Silver et al., Shedding New Light on the Grand Games of Chess, Shogi and
Go, DEEPMIND (Dec. 6, 2018), https://deepmind.com/blog/alphazeroshedding-new-light-grand-games-chess-shogi-and-go/.
TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, THE DEEP LEARNING REVOLUTION 20 (2018).
Id. (the author commented wryly, "[t]he aliens have landed and the earth will
never be the same again"); see also Blame iton the Robot?, MICH. TECH. L. REV.,
https://mttlr.org/2017/10/blame-it-on-the-robot/ (discussing earlier work
on AlphaGo); Cade Metz, DeepMind Can Now Beat Us at Multiplayer Games, Too,
N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/science/
deep-mind-artificial-intelligence.html.
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So in some domains, the sheer power of deep learning may
suffice, without the need for training examples.' It is difficult,
however, to see how that would translate to the domain of fair use
analysis. In chess, the rules of chess are given as the sole knowledge.
That is sufficient for the network to play games according to those
rules, to determine which side wins the game according to those
rules, and to give itself feedback. If the only input were the rules of
fair use, Section 107 of the Copyright Statute states the four-factor
rule, but not in a manner that determines how to apply it. Nor could
a program use the section to generate training examples. The rules
of cases are not built-in to Section 107 nor do they flow from it
automatically. But such pure reinforcement learning is still in early
days. Perhaps it could operate with relatively small data sets, which
would address one of the issues in adapting machine learning to legal
reasoning.
VI. GOOD NEIGHBORS MAKE GOOD ANALOGIES
Neural networks have great power in classifying, but present
considerable issues with respect to using them in fair use. Another
set of machine learning algorithms rely on the concept of analogy, a
basic reasoning process used in legal analysis as well. 2 0 0 The nearest
neighbor approach, a standby of the analogy approach, simply
attempts to identify, from the set of previous cases, which one is
most similar to the present case.201 More broadly, the approach may
identify the most similar cases (k-nearest neighbors, meaning the k
most similar cases) and use a statistical median of them. Netflix, for
example, might attempt to predict a viewer's preferences by finding
another viewer with the most similar viewing history and then
offering a film the second viewer liked. To match a face in a database
of images (such as Facebook might compile), it simply looks for
the closest match.2 02 One great advantage of the nearest neighbor
approach is that it is "lazy." 2 03 Rather than training a network by
199 Note that Deep Mind, although relying on deep learning, could be viewed as
unsupervised machine learning, where the algorithm is not given a specific
goal, as opposed to the supervised learning algorithms that, for example,
classify examples into predefined categories.
200 See DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 178-202 (discussing analogical reasoning in
machine learning); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning Commentary, 106
HARV. L. REv 741 (1993) (discussing analogical reasoning in legal reasoning).
201

DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 179-86.

202 Id. at 179-80.
203 Id. at 179-82.
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exposing it repeatedly to examples, a nearest neighbor algorithm
simply searches a database of examples to find the nearest match.
The technique also does not require the enormous datasets on which
the most sophisticated neural networks rely.
Such an algorithm could be used in a number of ways to apply
fair use. The most straightforward approach would be to predict
whether a case was fair use by simply relying on whether the most
similar case had been held to be fair use. Nearest neighbor here gives
two related advantages. There is no time spent training, although
an algorithm must be crafted that can rapidly search through the
database.2 04 By the same token, there is no need to implicitly form a
general model 205 about what is or is not fair use, rather simply to rely
on the closest match. Different weights can also be assigned to the
cases in running the program: "examples closest to the test example
should count for more." 2 06 Fair use has been notoriously resistant to
general characterization. But finding a close case may often resolve
an issue in satisfactory fashion. Other areas of law with flexible rules
might likewise be subject to this approach.
The success of this approach would depend critically on the
features chosen to match. Not all facts in a case are equally relevant.
An advantage of nearest neighbor is the savings in training a network
(or using it where training a network would be impracticable).
In balance, the feature engineering cannot rely on the network
determining which features are determinative or how they should be
weighed. Moreover, among the various machine learning algorithms,
nearest neighbor is especially likely to be slowed by numerous
features in the data, because it must search the entire database and
compare with each of those features. 2 0 7 So selecting a spare number

of features to compare would be necessary, by eliminating features
of little relevance or finding a way to combine related features. 208
Preprocessing the data would be key to determining the predictive
power of the program.
In some applications, that might not be as imposing a task
as would appear at first. To use nearest neighbor to reach a legal
204 Id. at 179-80.
205 Id. at 179 ("If you want to learn to recognize faces and have a vast database
of images labeled face/not face, just let it sit there. Don't worry, be happy.
Without knowing it, those images already implicitly form a model of what a
face is.").
206 Id. at 183.
207 Id. at 186.
208 Id. at 186-89.
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conclusion as to sets of facts, would require first determining the
characteristics of facts that would be considered, and processing both
the sample cases and the case to be decided into those parameters.
As noted above, that is not something any existing application
can do. But, per the Netflix example, if all that is required is a
prediction of the case (as opposed to legal analysis), then a simpler
approach might have acceptable accuracy. To figure out what films
might appeal to someone compared to other viewers, we might
consider an unmanageable set of facts: their personality, their taste
in entertainment, their sense of humor. But an acceptable predictor
might consider no facts about the person, rather simply their viewing
history, and look for another person with a similar viewing history.
It might be that in predicting whether a user is posting material
protected by fair use, comparing their posting history to a user
(or set of k users) with a similar history might yield an acceptable
prediction.
The lazy learning nature of nearest neighbor also might
enable its use at early stages of fair use analysis, in finding relevant
cases. Presented with a fact pattern, a lawyer or judge will wonder
whether there were other fair use cases involving the similar subject
matter (be it course web pages, marching band music, fan fiction,
etc.) or similar questions about the interplay between factors (where
the disfavored use may have somehow increased the market for the
work). Nearest neighbor could be used in such a way that relevant
features were chosen at run time and so used as a research tool or
otherwise to find related precedent. That would depend on the data
being compiled in a manner amenable to such flexible searching.
A more complex method of analogy in machine learning is
the use of support vector machines (SVM). SVMs work, in essence,
by drawing lines between sets of cases. 209 A SVM can separate cases
in a two-dimensional graph by drawing a line, in three dimensions
by drawing a plane, in four dimensions by drawing a hyperplane,
and so on. 2 10 Legal reasoning often turns on the similar concept of
drawing a line between cases (and other geometric analogies like not
letting open the floodgates or letting things down a slippery slope).
Like legal categorization, SVM's can handle outlier or mislabeled
cases, simply by tolerating some error - drawing the line in a way
that leaves some examples sitting in the wrong class. 2 11 Likewise,
209 See GARON, supra note 2, at 145-67.
210 See id. at 147-67.
211 See id. at 147.
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fair use case law contains cases that were wrongly decided, or at
least contrary to the present law of fair use.
The question whether machine learning algorithms in the
analogy camp are most useful in legal applications may depend on
a basic inquiry that remains as yet unsettled in jurisprudence (and
psychology, and biology, and philosophy, etc.). To what extent does
human reasoning depend on reasoning by analogy? There is a great
deal of literature on reasoning by analogy, but no basic agreement
even on such matters as what reasoning by analogy is and whether it
limits or enables reasoning.212 A useful way to think about reasoning
is the framework of deduction, induction and abduction, from
philosopher and logician Charles Sander Peirce. 2 13 To adapt one of
Peirce's examples: if all the beans in a bag are blue, and a bean is from
the bag, deductive reasoning (logical reasoning to certain conclusions)
tells us the bean is necessarily blue. If all the beans we have drawn
from another bag are green, inductive reasoning (generalizing from
examples) suggests that the next bean will probably be green.
If all the beans in another bag are pink, and there is a pink bean
lying near the bag, abductive reasoning ("interference to the best
explanation") 2 14 suggests that the bean came from the bag. 215 The
modes of reasoning vary as to reliability and productivity. Deductive
reasoning is completely reliable, but has lower productivity, because
it cannot give new knowledge beyond what can be logically inferred
from given premises. Inductive reasoning may be fairly reliable,
but even with many examples may yield an untrue result. The sun
comes up in the east every day, but some day will not. A turkey is
fed by the farmer every day - until Thanksgiving comes.2 16 Induction
212

See, e.g., STEVEN

PINKER,

THE

STUFF

OF THOUGHT

253-59

(2007)

(discussing various camps on whether analogy constrains or enables human
reasoning).
213

214

215

216

See Stephen M. McJohn, On Uberty: Legal Reasoning by Analogy and Peirce'sTheory
of Abduction, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 191, 192-93 (1993) [hereinafter
McJohn, Peirce].
Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Inference to the Best Explanation (Abduction),
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Feb. 17, 2019), https://1solum.typepad.com/
legaltheory/2019/02/legal-theory-lexicon-inference-to-the-best-explanationabduction.html.
McJohn, Peirce, supra note 213, at 197-98 ("Thus, where induction simply
infers that characteristics of a sample will apply to the whole (inferring a
general law from particulars), abduction infers an explaining hypothesis from
a body of data (what Peirce termed inferring cause from effect): Induction
classifies, abduction explains.").
DoMINGOS, supra note 2, at 61 (discussing Bertrand Russell's view on the
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is productive in a limited way, generalizing from new examples.
Abduction is the most productive form of reasoning, generating
hypotheses that may constitute new knowledge.217 But abduction is
also the least reliable. Those pink beans may come from somewhere
else. Many scientific hypotheses must be discarded, as must many
daily explanations.
Peirce's framework is useful, but not fully established. We use
induction widely, but philosophers, most notably Hume and Popper,
have shown that induction lacks the sort of solid demonstration of
deductive logic. 2 18 Abduction has received even less definition or
justification. Abduction seems to capture a basic human reasoning
ability. Even cognitive tasks that may be unconscious, such as visual
perception, involve making small abductive inferences 219 but how
we do it or what its logical structure is are yet to be elucidated.
The overall framework is nevertheless a useful way to think about
reasoning.
Analogical reasoning can be seen as a mixture of induction
and abduction. 2 2 0 Analogies between closely similar examples
(such as two factually similar cases) seem like induction. Analogies
between rather different examples (cases with similarities at a more
conceptual level) seem more like hypotheses. Whether algorithms
that depend on similarity, like nearest neighbor, are useful in fair use
will depend on whether that sort of similarity does play a reliable role
in fair use. It could be (and courts insist on the fact-bound nature
of fair use and its resistance to "mathematical" formulation) that
abduction's leap of insight must always be available. It may be that
machine learning algorithms can go beyond the sort of mechanical
analogy making of nearest neighbor, into the creative hypothesisformulation of abduction. But that would raise the issue of reliability.
problem of induction).
217 See McJohn, Peirce, supra note 213, at 200, 202 ('Abduction is synthetic,
seeking to form general laws and bring order to apparently disconnected
ideas. An abductive inference provides a way to see order and unity in what
was previously confusing.").
218 Leah Henderson, The Problem of Induction, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/ (last updated Sept.
21, 2019).
219 See McJohn, Peirce, supra note 213, at 203 ("Under Peirce's view, we use
abduction in all types of cognition, from the commonplace to the most
abstract. He regarded the extreme case of abduction to be the interpretation
inherent in the perceptive judgment.").
220 See id. at 209.
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People make hypotheses with ease, but many of those turn out to be
inaccurate. Some sort of check would have to be built in to software
that approached that same terrain.
VII. DECISION TREES - TRANSPARENT LEARNERS

A decision tree provides a model of decision-making
analogous to a flow chart. To give an unusually clear-cut example, a
decision tree could classify animals with such questions as: does it
have a backbone? Does it have fur? Does it give birth to live young?
The decision tree classifies the example according to its features and
returns a marsupial, or in a different path, a grass. The decision tree
can be built by classifying the data to create the branches of the
trees. The algorithm chooses a likely feature, uses it to divide the
set, then uses another feature to divide the set, then continues the
process until a maximum chosen depth is reached or there remains
no feature that can reliably divide the set. 22 1 A set of cases may not
divide perfectly into nodes at the ends of the decision tree branches.
The tree can still be used to estimate the probability that an example
belongs in a particular category by using the ratio of classes that
end up in a particular node.2 22 For example, Microsoft's Kinect video
game controller uses a decision tree to "figure out where various
parts of your body are from the output of its depth camera; it can
then use their motions to control the Xbox game console."2 23
A decision tree could conceivably track the factors identified
by the Copyright Act and big three fair use judicial decisions: Is the
use commercial? Is the use transformative? Is there a negative effect
on the market? Was the work unpublished? Different features might
be used on various branches. The tree would be reliable if it produced
leaf nodes 2 24 with reliable classification. That would mean that fair
use cases could be broken into sets, such as that a noncommercial,
transformative, no-negative-market-effect use was usually fair, even
221

GARON, supra note 2, at 171 ("Once it has successfully split the training set in
two, it splits the subsets using the same logic, then the sub-subsets and so on,
recursively. It stops recursing once it reaches the maximum depth (defined by
the maxdepth hyperparameter), or if it cannot find a split that will reduce
impurity.").
222 Id. ('A Decision Tree can also estimate the probability that an instance belongs
to a particular class k: first it traverses the tree to find the leaf node for this
instance, and then it returns the ratio of training instances of class k in this
node.").
223

DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 88.

224 A leaf node is the end of a decision branch. Id. at 86.
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if the copied work was unpublished. Alternatively, features could
be defined by the facts of cases: Is the work software? Was the use
reverse-engineering? Did defendant obtain the work lawfully? These
categories might yield predictive classes. Features beyond the record
of the case could have predictive value. A Decision tree built from
statistics drawn from "six observable characteristics," such as circuit
of origin and general legal area of a case, had a higher success rate
in predicting affirmance or reversal in Supreme Court cases than a
panel of legal experts (although the experts' predictions of the votes
of individual judges were slightly better).225
Decision trees have a great advantage for use in the legal
domain. A difficult policy issue with machine learning and much
other software is the black box problem: programs make decisions or
predictions without stating the underlying reasoning. 226 A complex
neural net may classify examples from a set of data but will not state
the reasons why. Decision trees, by their very nature, provide the
structure of the decision process.
For example, if a neural network says that a particular
person appears on a picture, it is hard to know what
actually contributed to this prediction: did the model
recognize that person's eyes? Her mouth? Her nose?
Her shoes? Or even the couch that she was sitting on?
Conversely, Decision Trees provide nice and simple
classification rules that can even be applied manually
if need be[.]

22 7

If machine learning could produce a reliable decision tree for fair
use, then, it would have perfect transparency. 228
225

226

227
228

Andrew D. Martin et al., Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court
Decision Making, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 761 (2004). The characteristics used were
"(1) the circuit of origin for the case; (2) the issue area of the case, coded
from the petitioner's brief using Spaeth's protocol; (3) the type of petitioner
(e.g., the United States, an injured person, an employer); (4) the type of
respondent; (5) the ideological direction of the lower court ruling, also coded
from the petitioner's brief using Spaeth's protocol; and (6) whether or not the
petitioner argued the constitutionality of a law or practice." Id. at 762.
See, e.g., Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failureof Intent
and Causation, 31 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 889, 907 (2018) ("To be sure, we may be
able to tell what the Al's overarching goal was, but black-box Al may do things
in ways the creators of the Al may not understand or be able to predict.").
GARON, supranote 2, at 170.
Note that multiple decision trees may be used, which improves the overall
predictive power, in the Random Forest technique. The use of many trees,
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"If",because the decision tree, compared to other algorithms,
is more demanding in the form of data on which it can operate.
For example, "the main issue with Decision Trees is that they are
very sensitive to small variations in the training data." 2 29 Whatever
the features are for legal data, they may be subject to variation.
A case could be decided differently. A use might be considered
transformative or not depending on which circuit's law applies. The
reliance on reasoning by analogy between the facts of cases introduces
flexibility, but also complicates categorization. The characterization
of features in the training data - a key issue for machine learning
and the law generally - is especially acute given the somewhat brittle
nature of decision trees, compared to neural networks, with their
gradual adjustment to the data.
Having said that, the method compensates by offering the
ability to use probabilities. If the cases can be sorted into different
nodes, then the decision process would predict whether the case is
fair use but qualify that prediction with a probability by comparison
with other cases generally sharing the same set of attributes.
Decision trees, then, have the disadvantage of being especially
dependent on data with features amenable to classification, and
sensitivity to small variation. That might render them unfit for
handling fair use generally until efforts to preprocess legal data
are more successful (whether by tagging or finding attributes by
clustering or other approaches). But decision trees have the advantage
of transparency, along with the option of predicting by probability.
That could mean that they could be deployed in narrowly defined
areas even before the battles with data are won. An automated fair
use check for music uploads, for example, might have good predictive
power with some definable features drawn from the case law (is
the work copyrighted, how much is uploaded, does the uploader
have a history of infringement, what is the difference between the
works, if any). The algorithm would no doubt make errors, but the
transparency of decision trees would make them more easily subject
to dispute, such as in a counter-takedown process.2 30 If a post was
however, greatly reduces the ability to trace the decision-making process. See
id. at 181, 189-90.
229 Id. at 177.
230 Section 512 of the DMCA provides internet service providers immunity from
copyright infringement by their users, provided the internet service provider,
among other things, has a system in place to respond to takedown notices
from copyright owners and counter takedown notices from the user that
posted the content. See, e.g., Kathleen O'Donnell, Lenz v. UniversalMusic Corp.
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taken down, the poster could get notification along with the specific
reasons why the post was taken down. Although lawyers might
recoil, the notice could even contain a probability determination ("It
is our experience that 85% of similar posts are infringing."). The
poster could then have an opportunity to respond. Decision trees
may prove to have practical value in lower stakes, repeat player
settings.
VIII. UNSUPERVISED LEARNING: PATTERN DETECTION

Supervised machine learning is used to classify examples into
pre-determined categories, such as potentially classifying examples
as fair use/not fair use. The algorithm "learns" to detect patterns
correlated to the specified classification. Unsupervised machine
learning, by contrast, leaves it to the algorithm to find patterns of
any sort, to see if useful information can be gained. Data mining
is the classic example, where unsupervised learning is used on a
large body of data to find patterns. Unsupervised machine learning
might likewise reveal some useful patterns within fair use. As noted
above, 23 1 unsupervised machine learning can find clusters in data
and even operate on those clusters to find more abstract clusters.2 32
Unsupervised machine learning may detect patterns: for example,
"principal component analysis," used for determining which aspects
of data contribute most to its distribution, can identify the factors
that carry the greatest weight in functions. 23 3 A similar algorithm
"has a surprising ability to zero in on the most important dimensions
of complex data." 23 4 It might show which factors have the biggest
say in fair use - and whether those factors are the ones that the
courts expressly consider.
A common view is that fair use is replete with fact-specific
case law rather than common principles. 23 5 Under this view, some
and the PotentialEffect of Fair Use Analysis Under the Takedown Proceduresof § 512 of
theDMCA, 2009 DUKE L. & TECH. REv., 1, ¶10, ¶15 (2009).
231 See discussion of using unsupervised machine learning to preprocess data
supranotes 20-21.
232 DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 210.
233 Id. at 213-214 (using the example of examining the locations of businesses
to find the underlying pattern, that they were arranged in proximity to the
principal street in a town).
234 Id. at 217 (discussing Isomap, "[olne of the most popular algorithms for
nonlinear dimensionality reduction").
235 See, e.g., Michael W Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007)
("While the doctrine's attention to context has many salutary attributes, it is
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cases might be clearly fair use (quoting a few lines in a book review)
or clearly not fair use (selling unauthorized copies of movies for sheer
profit) but the cases in the middle are not reliably predictable. A
refined version is that fair use, as legal doctrine, may be incoherent, 23 6
but may be more predictable when analyzed in light of social and
cultural patterns.2 37 Others argue that fair use is no less predictable
than other areas of case-bound law.23 8

There are several types of patterns which might be disclosed.
It could be that the four factors, as elucidated by the courts, are
applied in a consistent fashion, even if the language of the various
judicial opinions masks that somewhat. As noted above, fair use
cases may divide not so much by the four statutory factors but
by "policy-relevant clusters." 23 9 It could also be the case that legal

doctrine is vague enough to lack consistent predictive power, but
that underlying social and cultural patterns drive the application
of fair use in a consistent manner.24 0 Other patterns might also be
found. Reading fair use cases (as with many intellectual property
cases) raises questions about such issues as home-town advantage.

236

237

238

239
240

so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance about its scope to artists,
educators, journalists, Internet users, and others who require use of another's
copyrighted expression in order to communicate effectively.").
Madison, supra note 81, at 1586-87 ("[T]he Supreme Court's formal
jurisprudence has encouraged the courts of appeals, and presumably the
district courts following their lead, to abstract the fair use inquiry to the point
of incoherence").
Id. at 1622 ("I review what social and cultural patterns are and describe how
an emphasis on those phenomena can be reconciled with the language of the
current fair use statute. The second section below compares the generalized
patterns model developed in the first section and applies it more broadly to
fair use case law since enactment of the current copyright statute.").
Samuelson, supra note 82, at 2541-42 (footnote omitted) ("[F]air use law
is both more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have
perceived once one recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common
patterns, or what this Article will call policy-relevant clusters. The policies
underlying modem fair use law include promoting freedom of speech
and of expression, the ongoing progress of authorship, learning, access to
information, truth telling or truth seeking, competition, technological
innovation, and privacy and autonomy interests of users.").
Id.
Madison, supra note 81, at 1622 ("I review what social and cultural patterns
are and describe how an emphasis on those phenomena can be reconciled
with the language of the current fair use statute. The second section below
compares the generalized patterns model developed in the first section and
applies it more broadly to fair use case law since enactment of the current
copyright statute.").
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An adaptation of a Manhattan-centric cover of New Yorker magazine,
used as an advertisement for the film Moscow on the Hudson, failed to
find support in fair use - when the case was decided in Manhattan,
in the Southern District of New York.2 4 1
For fair use - and legal scholarship generally - the prospect
of detecting patterns is of great interest. As noted above, legal
reasoning relies on analogy, and yet the nature of analogical
reasoning is elusive. Identifying the patterns that correspond to
what judges and lawyers deem to be strong analogies could throw a
lot on analogical reasoning. It could also bring yet another round of
legal realism by showing what is going on underneath the hood of
the legal engines of reasoning. That said, we must recall that one of
the great challenges of machine learning is detecting patterns that
do not correspond to any real phenomenon, such as overfitting the
data to develop descriptions that are actually too complex. If patterns
are detected, whether indicating legal, social, or cultural patterns,
then appropriate skepticism should apply. The finding of patterns
is a suggestion, not a determination: "It's even been said that data
mining means 'torturing the data until it confesses."' 2 4 2 With fair use
in particular, the perhaps limited number of cases available to train
the network may raise the risk of error.243 As with other forms of
machine learning, a detected pattern can be tested against sets of
data other than the training set to see if the same pattern is found.2 4 4
Unsupervised learning is often used as an exploratory approach, that
may be a fruitful source of hypotheses, but those hypotheses must
be further tested.2 4 5
IX. MECHANICAL FAIR USE PROHIBITED?
Legal issues may arise with the implementation of a fair use
algorithm, especially depending on its specific deployment (who
uses it and for what purpose, whether it simply is a research tool
or effectively makes a decision, and who is affected by the use).
241

Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 E Supp. 706, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

242
243

DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 72-73.
See GiRON, supra note 2, at 22-23.

244 DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 75 ("So how do you decide whether to believe
what the learner tells you? Simple: you don't believe anything until you've
verified it on data that the learnerdidn't see.").
245 Muller & Guido, supra note 123, at 132 ('As a consequence, unsupervised
algorithms are used often in an exploratory setting, when a data scientist
wants to understand the data better, rather than as part of a larger automatic
system.").
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Two issues are particularly worth noting. In addition to technical
considerations of using machine learning to assess fair use, it is
at least possible that legal considerations could limit the practice.
A recent Eleventh Circuit case, Cambridge University Press v. Patton,

squarely held that it was error for a court to rely on a "mathematical
formula" to assessing the factors in fair use. 2 46 The court emphasized,
as have others, that "fair use is not a mechanical determination."2 4 7
Read for everything it's worth, that would bar machine learning
assessment of fair use, at least by judges.
Machine learning is the implementation of statistics on a
large scale. It may remain a moot point until judicial decisions are
handed over to computers. More realistic is whether such a bar could
extend to private parties. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act gives
internet service providers immunity for infringement by their users,
provided, among a number of conditions, that the service providers
set up a process to respond when copyright owners send take-down
notices. 2 48 A copyright claimant may send a take-down notice only
in good faith. 249 The Lenz case notably held that a take-down could
246 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 E3d 1290, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2018) ('As
the Supreme Court has explained and as we reiterated in Cambridge II, 'the
four statutory factors may not be treated in isolation, one from another. All
are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes
of copyright.' We emphasized that 'fair use is not a mechanical determination,'
and that a court must 'weigh[] ... the four factors in light of the facts of a given
case,'. To be sure, the district court described its arithmetic weights as 'initial'
and 'approximate,' and it stated that it would 'adjust[]' them when it found
a 'noteworthy strength or weakness' among the factors. But the district court
made such adjustments only four times, each time to bolster the importance
of the third factor's weighing against fair use. And, on those four occasions,
the district court did nothing to adjust the other factors in the overall fairuse calculus. We conclude that the district court's quantitative rubric was an
improper substitute for a qualitative consideration of each instance of copying
in the light of its particular facts.") (quoting Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton,
769 E3d 1232, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014)).
247 Id. The decision can also be seen as addressing the question, whether fair
use analysis can be structured with specific rules applicable to common fact
settings. See Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59
ARIz. L. REV. 161, 163-65 (2017) ("Can fair use be rulified in this manner?
A recent Eleventh Circuit decision brought this issue to the forefront of legal
discourse. In Cambridge University Press v. Patton, the court repudiated the
attempt made by the lower court to offer a rule-like elaboration of fair use in
the context of an educational e-reserve system.") (citation omitted).
248 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
249 Id. On automated copyright enforcement generally, see Maayan Perel & Niva
Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN.

VOL. 12, No. 1

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

153

be sent in bad faith if there was a failure to consider whether the
material was posted as fair use.250
One might argue then, that Cambridge University Press's

disapprobation of a mathematical approach to fair use might mean
that using machine learning to vet take-down notices before sending
would be bad faith. Take-down senders, attempting to monitor and
protect thousands of copyrighted works, are hardly to be held to the
same standard as federal judges deciding individual cases. But there
would be a requirement that the software meet some standard of
assessing fair use, as opposed to a mere formality. 25 1 At a deeper level,
a network trained on many cases to discern and classify examples
of fair use is different than the approach disavowed in Cambridge
University Press. There (at least in the appellate court's view), the
trial court set mechanical numbers to weigh the various factors and
applied them to the instances before it, without consideration of the
interaction of the factors and the goals of fair use.
A network trained on cases to classify examples would
necessarily have discerned in case patterns how those factors
are interrelated. As opposed to mathematically applying preset
weights, ignoring the policies of fair use, a reliable classifier would
mathematically have adjusted the weights within the network to
continue applying those policies as previous cases have (for better
or worse). Nor is using machine learning on a problem a mechanical
process. As with other software, the performance and modelling of
a machine learner is evaluated and then the software adjusted to
attempt to improve performance.2 52 It would seem that automated
fair use need not be mechanical and so could be consistent with fair
use jurisprudence, notwithstanding the protean nature of fair use.
Another possible issue is the use of personal data. The
European Union's General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR")
raised substantially the regulations of data online, prompting
websites to modify their processes such that websites now tell us
they use cookies and often ask for our consent, as many of us have
by now experienced. 25 3 The GDPR restricts automated decisions
L. REV. 473 (2016).
250 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 E3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015).
251 An analogous issue is whether "machine opinion evidence," the output of
neural networks, should be admissible as evidence. See generally Curtis E.A.
Karnow, The Opinion ofMachines, 19 COLUM. ScL & TECH. L. REV. 136 (2017).
252 See, e.g., GARON, supra note 2, at 253-311 (chapter on Model Evaluation and
Improvement).
253 See Sean O'Brien, GDPR: Don't Forget to Bring a Towel, BOING BOING (May
TECH.

154

McJohn and McJohn

concerning individuals based on data,254 albeit with numerous
expansive exceptions. 255 The regulation is in early days, so its
scope and exceptions remain to be fleshed out. 25 6 It may well be
that the GDPR does not come into play, where decisions are made
automatically and may involve some personal data but are not in the
nature of profiling, where the data is used to make decisions about
the individual 25 7 (automated decision-making about whether a post
by an internet user was fair use would likely focus on the use itself,
and not the post, thereby avoiding the sort of user profiling that
likely triggers the GDPR) .258 But the copyright holders have been
successful in persuading the European Union to tighten restrictions

254

255

&

256

25, 2018), https://boingboing.net/2018/05/25/gdpr-dont-forget-to-bring-a.
html.
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 46 (EU) ("The data subject shall
have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him
or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.").
Maja Brkan, Al-Supported Decision-Making Under the General Data Protection
Regulation, in SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, supra note 40, at 3-4 (2017) ("The GDPR, in
its Article 22, prohibits automated individual decision making, including
profiling. On the first impression, it seems that this provision strongly
protects individuals and potentially even hampers the future development
of AI in decision-making. However, it can be argued that this prohibition,
containing numerous limitations and exceptions, looks like a Swiss cheese
with giant holes in it.").
See, e.g., Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right
to an Explanation'Is ProbablyNot the Remedy You are Looking For, 16 DUKE L.
TECH. REV. 18, 20-21 (2019) ("There has been a flurry of interest in a socalled 'right to an explanation' that has been claimed to have been introduced
in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).").
On legal responsibility for AI decisions more broadly, see Ignacio N. Cofone,
Servers and Waiters: What Matters in the Law of A.I., 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
167, 170 (2018) ("Who should be responsible for accidents caused by selfdriving cars? Who owns the copyright over work created by an algorithm? Do
algorithms have free speech? Can an A.I. agent be responsible for a crime?
Can it be an accessory to a crime?").
Cf Maja Brkan, Al-Supported Decision-Making Under the General Data Protection
Regulation, in SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, supra note 40, at 6 ("These examples demonstrate
that the provision of the Data Protection Directive seemed to focus mostly on
instances of profiling based on automated processing of data, not including
other types of automated decision-making involving processing of personal
data.").

257

258
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on even linking to copyrighted content, to the extent that Google
may shut down Google News in some European countries. 25 9 Future
copyright legislation in Europe and elsewhere may take on the
question of automated assessment of fair use.260 In some contexts,
safeguards should be in place to protect against the particular
vagaries of machine learning.
X. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DOMAINS AMENABLE TO MACHINE
LEARNING

Thinking about how various machine learning approaches
would apply to fair use raises a question about whether other areas
of intellectual property might be more or less suitable domains. Two
possible applications seem to have more bounded data structures,
which might make using machine learning more realistic.
Patent law, in general, could seem even iffier for machine
learning, with its preference for strictly defined, concrete
inventions.26 1 Machine learning, however, can learn to classify by
using examples.2 62 Patent law, in a sense, defies categorization.
A claimed invention must be deemed patentable or not; this is a
classification problem. The standard for patentability (unlike
copyright, trademark, or any other type of intellectual property)
requires novelty and nonobviousness.2 6 3 In short, every patentable
invention, by the standard of patentability, should be something
unique. Classification programs should be able to deal with
unprecedented examples. But a patentable invention should be not
259

Cory Doctorow, We lost the fight for balance in the EU's Copyright Directive, but
here's what we won, BOING BOING (Apr. 18, 2019), https://boingboing.
net/2019/04/18/we-fight-on.html; see also Paris Martineau, The UK's Tech
Backlash Could Change the Internet, WIRED (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.wired.
com/story/uk-tech-backlash-could-change-internet/.
260 As Danny O'Brien, international director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(a digital rights nonprofit group that opposed the bill) and opponent of the
bill, said about proposed (as yet unsuccessfully) strict online copyright rules
in Europe, "[tihere's no way that those algorithmic filters are going to be
able to decide that something is fair use, parody, a meme or a mash-up."
Adam Satariano, Tech Giants Win a Battle Over Copyright Rules in Europe, N.Y.
TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/euparliament-copyright.html.
261 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 1090, 222-25 (2014) (limiting
patents on abstract inventions, particularly applicable to software inventions).
262 See, e.g., GARON, supra note 2, at 79-102 (chapter on classification using
machine learning).
263 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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just unprecedented (novel) but also significantly different from any
previous invention (nonobvious).
In another respect, however, patent law channels inventors
toward structuring data in a way that copyright does not. An author
gets copyright automatically upon creating a work,264 and may
choose to register the work by filling out a form and depositing
copies of the work. 26 5 An inventor, however, is entitled to a patent
only if she (or, more commonly, her patent lawyer) drafts patent
claims which distinctly claim the invention and differentiate it from
previous technology. 266 That previous technology may be described
in publications, in products or services available to the public, or
- in the most commonly applied category - the claims of previous
patents in relevant technology.26 7 When patent examiners consider

whether a claimed invention is new and nonobvious, the examiner
looks primarily, often exclusively, at the claims of previous relevant
patents. 26 8 A patent claim is one sentence long, albeit often one
horrifically complex, opaque sentence.2 69
The determination of patentability, then, often consists
of comparing the inventor's one-sentence-long claim to other
patent claims. That is more bounded than fair use, which involves
264

265

266
267
268

269

17 U.S.C. § 102(4) (a) (2012) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance
with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.").
Id. § 408 ("At any time during the subsistence of the first term of copyright in
any published or unpublished work in which the copyright was secured before
January 1, 1978, and during the subsistence of any copyright secured on or
after that date, the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the work
may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright
Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the application and
fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not a condition of
copyright protection.").
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
See id. § 102(a).
See, e.g., Jie Qi et al., Prior Art, PATENT PANDAS, https://patentpandas.
org/resources/prior-art (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) ("Even though prior art
officially comes in many forms, patent examiners pretty much only look at
existing patent and patent applications for prior art.").
See, e.g., Stephen Schott, An Appeal to the New Patent Office Director:Repeal the
Single Sentence Rule, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 18, 2009), https://patentlyo.com/
media/docs/2009/09/schott.sentence.patentlyo.pdf ("But after all this careful
work, the drafter may be left with an impenetrable sentence of a length not
seen since Matthew begatted Jesus's lineage back to Abraham.").
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comparing two works to each other. Copyrighted works can be
thousands of sentences, or musical notes, or pixels. Fair use
can require comparing one type of work to another, such as the
unauthorized use of unpublished letters to a biography about their
author, or a play to a movie. So patentability will at least work with
more structured data. The claim will likely be a sentence never before
used, though linguistics tells us this of perhaps all sentences. 2 70
Perhaps surprisingly, most sentences in this paper may never have
been written before. Yet Google Translate, which now operates on
the sentence as the basic unit to translate, 27 1 could render a fairly
good Chinese translation. Whether a sentence claims a patentable
invention is quite a different task, but one that would seem to be in
the class of engineering problems, as opposed to mere speculation.
The legal determinations of patentability in general are no less
complex, raising such abstract issues as patentable subject matter,
which in turn requires considering the boundaries of such concepts
as abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena. These
can be skirted, however. One could limit the question to novelty
and nonobviousness, thereby leaving out questions of patentable
subject matter. Or one could simply not try to define those abstract
categories, rather considering only whether the claim at issue was
more similar to claims deemed patentable or not.
Not surprisingly, there have been some reported attempts
to use machine learning in patent drafting.2 72 After looking at the
related issues in fair use, it seems likely that machine learning will
be most useful where the focus is on patent claims and where the
claims are relatively similar, such as where an improvement is made
in a well-defined area of technology. Machine learning may be less
useful where the differences in claims are more abstract. The flip side
270

See STEVEN

PINKER,

THE

LANGUAGE

INSTINCT:

HOW

THE

MIND

22 (1994) ("[Noam] Chomsky called attention to two
fundamental facts about language. First, virtually every sentence that a person
utters or understands is a brand-new combination of words, appearing for the
first time in the history of the universe.").
CREATES LANGUAGE

271
272

See Wu, supra note 6.
See David Hricik, Machine Aided Patent Drafting:A Second Look, PATENTLY-O

(Aug.

25,

2017),

https://patentlyo.com/hricik/2017/08/machine-patent-

drafting.html; Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite
Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 32, 35 (2015)
("Cloem is attempting (not satirically, it appears) to use brute-force computing
to mechanically compose text for thousands of patent claims covering
potentially novel inventions and also to generate defensive publications to
prevent others from obtaining patent protection in the same field.").
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of patent protection relying on verbal claims is that quite different
sectors of technology may fall within a broadly worded patent claim.
A patent on an invention to report falls by elderly people was infringed
by the Wii video game controller, because both relied on using an
accelerometer to detect rapid downward movement. 273 It is unlikely

that a claim drafted for the Wii would have been verbally similar
to the fall-detector claim. In the same vein, a basic problem with
software patents is that broad attempts to claim software inventions
yielded claims that subsequently could be read to cover technology
well beyond the real scope of the first inventor's invention.
Trademark registration also offers an interesting possibility.
One of the two most common reasons a trademark application is
rejected by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
is that the applicant's mark is too similar to a previously registered
mark: in trademark parlance, the applicant's mark is likely to cause
confusion with the registered mark.274 If there is a likelihood of
confusion, the mark will be denied registration. 275 Like fair use,
likelihood of confusion is a multi-factor test: whether two marks are
likely to be confused depends on such matters as how similar the
two marks are and how distinctive the marks are, but also how close
in the market the marks are, how well known they are, and how
sophisticated relevant consumers are.276 In some respects, however,
it is more bounded. First, unlike fair use, likelihood of confusion
has a standard, if a fuzzy one: whether the proffered mark is likely
to cause confusion. Second, the consideration by the USPTO is
more limited than the consideration of similar issue in trademark
litigation. If a mark holder sues for trademark infringement, they
must prove likelihood of confusion in the marketplace context,
considering the actual uses of the two marks.277 The USPTO limits
273

.
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See Joe Mullin, Jury Finds Nintendo Wii Infringes Dallas Inventor's Patent, Awards
$10M, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 1, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2017/09/jury-finds-nintendo-wii-infringes-dallas-inventors-patentawards-I Om/.
See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Possible Groundsfor Refusal of a Mark (July
11,
2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/additional-guidance-andresources/possible-grounds-refusal-mark ("The USPTO may be required to
refuse registration of your mark on numerous grounds. The most common
are: Likelihood of Confusion . .
Id.
See id.
See, e.g, Viacom Int'l v. IJR Capital Invs., L.L.C., 891 E3d 178, 198 (5th Cir.
2018) (analyzing likelihood of confusion between Krusty Krab restaurant and
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its consideration to the categories of use defined in the trademark
application (although other factors may permit consideration of
real-world facts).278 So rather than facts about the markets in which
the marks operate, the analysis considers the numerical category
of registration. The overall analysis is even more circumscribed by
the examples considered. Where fair use compares two works, and
patent law compares two complex claims, likelihood of confusion in
trademark compares two marks. Of the many factors, the similarity
of the two marks has been described as the most important factor.279
A likelihood of confusion program could be quite useful.
Trademark searching is somewhat an art, rather than a science,
and such a program would be a useful tool. The imperfections of
machine learning might also be quite bearable in the search context.
A prospective mark user would get some guidance as to whether
their proposed mark would pass muster but need not place great
reliance on the program's output. In particular, even if a false positive
meant that the applicant needlessly abandoned their plans to use the
mark and sought another, that may not be a great loss, if used at
the stage before marketing and other trademark-related investment.
Other marks are available and a rose by any other name would smell
as sweet.280
However, a program based simply on the trademark
register would only address one part of considering use of a
mark. Unregistered marks may also have validity and priority
against subsequent marks. Amazon.com learned this when it
had to contend with the unregistered mark for Amazon Books,
which might have had priority, limited to its area of actual use in
fictional Krusty Krab restaurant of SpongeBob SquarePants cartoon show).
278 TMEP § 1207.01(a) (iii) (Oct. 2018), https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/
current#/current/TMEP-1200dlel.html
("Reliance on Identification of
Goods/Services in Registration and Application: The nature and scope of a
party's goods or services must be determined on the basis of the goods or
services recited in the application or registration.").
279 Cf Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (finding that similarity of marks
is the greatest factor in infringement likelihood of confusion cases).
280 The supply of potential trademarks is not unlimited. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne
C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark
Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 951 (2018) ("Specifically,
the data present compelling evidence of substantial word-mark depletion,
particularly with respect to the sets of potential marks that businesses prefer
most: standard English words, short neologisms that are pronounceable by
English speakers, and common American surnames.").
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Minneapolis. 28 1 Amazon settled that suit, and other companies
have had to adjust after adopting marks only to learn later that a
confusingly similar mark had priority.28 2 A learner trained only on
the trademark register would not take them into consideration.
XI. CONCLUSION

Applying machine learning to fair use faces considerable
hurdles. Fair use has generated hundreds of reported cases, but
machine learning works best with examples in greater numbers.
More examples may be available, from mining the decision-making
of websites, having humans judge fair use examples just as they label
images to teach self-driving cars, and using machine learning itself
to generate examples. Beyond the number of examples, the form
of the data is more abstract than the concrete examples on which
machine learning has succeeded, such as computer vision, viewing
recommendations, and even in comparison to machine translation,
where the operative unit was the sentence, not a concept that could
be distributed across a document. But techniques presently in use
do find patterns in data to build more abstract features, and then use
the same process to build more abstract features. It may be that such
automated processes can provide the conceptual blocks necessary.
281

Bookstore Battles Internet Amazon Over Use of its Name: Amazon Bookstore Inc. v.
Amazon.com Inc., 2 ANDREWS COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. LITIG. REP. 5
(1999) ('Amazon Bookstore, a Minneapolis bookstore that caters to women,
seeks both injunctive relief and damages for what it says is Amazon.com's
'unauthorized and improper use' of the trademark Amazon."').
282 Amy Goetzman, The Stuff of Herstory: Original Amazon Bookstore to
Close, MINNPOST
(June 5, 2008),
https://www.minnpost.com/artsculture/2008/06/stuff-herstory-original-amazon-bookstore-close/
("The
real Amazon received a small cash settlement from the online store, and
used the money to keep the business going a little longer."); Keith Bradsher
Apple Settles an iPad Dispute in China, N.Y. TI MES (July 2, 2012), https://www.
nytimes.com/2012/07/02/business/global/apple-settles-an-ipad-trademarkdispute-in-china.html ('A Chinese provincial court said on Monday that
Apple had settled a lawsuit there by agreeing to pay $60 million for the legal
rights to use the iPad trademark in China, according to Xie Xianghui, a lawyer
for the Chinese company involved."); Timothy 0. Stevenson, The Importance
of Trademark Clearance Searches in Brand Development, MARTINDALE (Feb. 27,
2015), https://www.martindale.com/intellectual-property-law/articleSmartBiggar-Fetherstonhaugh_2193454.htm ("Only then did the agency discover
that Motel 6 in fact owns a registered trademark in Canada for 'We'll leave
the light on for you,' and consequently the slogan in the Yukon tourism
commercials was quickly changed to 'Come to my Yukon - We'll light the
way. ').

VOL. 12, No. 1

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

161

In addition, tools drawn from knowledge engineering (the branch
of artificial intelligence that of late has been eclipsed by machine
learning) may extract concepts from such data as judicial opinions.
Such tools would include new methods of knowledge representation
and automated tagging.
If the data questions are overcome, machine learning provides
intriguing possibilities, but also faces challenges from the nature
of fair use law. Artificial neural networks have shown formidable
performance in classification. Classifying fair use examples raises a
number of questions. Fair use law is often considered contradictory,
vague, and unpredictable. In computer science terminology, the
data is "noisy." That inconsistency could flummox artificial neural
networks, or the networks could disclose consistencies that have
eluded commentators. Other algorithms such as nearest neighbor
and support vectors could likewise test the consistency of legal
reasoning by analogy. Decision trees may be simpler than other
approaches in some respects but could work on smaller data sets
(addressing one of the data issues above) and provide something
that machine learning problematically lacks: transparency. Decision
trees disclose their decision-making process, where neural networks
are opaque black boxes. Finally, unsupervised machine learning
could be used to explore fair use case law for patterns, whether they
be consistent structures in its jurisprudence, or biases that have
played an undisclosed role. 28 3 Any possible patterns found should be
treated as possibilities, pending testing by other means.
It may well be that early generation fair use algorithms are
like spam filters or machine translation. Such software does not
read and interpret the meaning of the text at issue, rather it relies
on the power of networks to find statistical linkages that permit
high-probability assessment of results. Whether later generations
of software will be able to conduct fair use assessments in the same
manner that lawyers do depends on the improvement of machine
learning in identifying abstractions and representing knowledge.
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Potential bias is a pervasive issue in the applications of machine learning
and data. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REv. 395,
397 (2018) ('Alternatively, the data may be accurate as far as it goes but
problematic insofar as it incorporates prior discrimination, as when past
performance evaluations are tainted by conscious or unconscious bias.");
Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REv. 633 (2017).
On the other hand, algorithms may avoid human biases. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Algorithms, CorrectingBiases, 86 Soc. REs. 499 (2019).

